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SELF-AUTHENTICATION OF CERTIFIED COPIES
OF BUSINESS RECORDS
Lynn McLaint
I. INTRODUCTION
In adopting Maryland Rule 5-902(a)(11),' the Court of Appeals
of Maryland created a new method of authenticating business re-
cords, an alternative available in addition to the traditional means
followed at common law and still permissible under the Rules. The
Rule provides that certified copies or certified originals of business
records are self-authenticating. 2
Although the Maryland Rule has no counterpart in the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 3 it is modeled on an August 1986 amendment
to the Uniform Rules of Evidence4 that in turn was derived from
a federal statute. Section 3505 of Article 18 of the United States
t B.A., University of Pennsylvania; J.D., Duke Law School; Professor, Univer-
sity of Baltimore School of Law. From 1988-1993, the author served as a
Special Reporter to Maryland's Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure. The author also served in the same capacity to the
Evidence Subcommittee during the drafting of the proposed Maryland code of
evidence. The author thanks University of Baltimore associate law librarian
Will Tress for his research assistance, Barbara C. Jones for her excellent
secretarial work, and James K. Archibald, Esq., Gary E. Bair, Esq., Paul D.
Bekman, Esq., and Paul Mark Sandier, Esq. for their helpful comments on a
draft of this Article.
1. See infra text accompanying note 31 for content of Maryland Rule 5-902(a)(1 1).
2. If an item is self-authenticating, no additional evidence is needed in order to
permit a finding that the item is authentic, i.e., what it appears to be.
3. In adopting Title 5 of the Maryland Rules of Court, the Maryland Rules of
Evidence, effective July 1, 1994, the Maryland court of appeals simply declined
to follow the Federal Rules of Evidence. See LYNN McLAIN, MARYLAND RULES
OF EVIDENCE § 1.4, at 11-12 (1994) [hereinafter MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE].
In many instances, Maryland forged its own way, either because of
preexisting Maryland statutory law, see, e.g., MD. RULES 5-412, 5-903, or case
law, see, e.g., MD. RULES 5-704(b), 5-802.1(a), 5-802.1(d), 5-803(b)(4), 5-1006,
or rules, see, e.g., MD. RULE 5-103(a)(1), that were at odds with the federal
approach, or because of the court of appeals' distinctive resolution of relevant
policy considerations, see, e.g., MD. RULES 5-613, 5-615(c), 5-802.1(a), 5-
804(b)(2). The New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Rules of Evidence
took a similar approach in its drafting of Rules of Evidence that were adopted
by the New Jersey Supreme Court, effective July 1, 1993. N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:84A, at 83-85 (West 1994).
4. UNIF. R. EVID. 902(11); see infra note 49.
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Code provides that certified copies of foreign business records are
self-authenticating in criminal proceedings.5 The Uniform Rule ex-
tended this approach to embrace both domestic business records
and civil proceedings; 6 prior to the adoption of Maryland's Rule,7
5. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 228, at 57 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
18 U.S.C. § 3505 provides:
§ 3505. Foreign records of regularly conducted activity
(a)(l) In a criminal proceeding in a court of the United States, a
foreign record of regularly conducted activity, or a copy of such
record, shall not be excluded as evidence by the hearsay rule if a
foreign certification attests that -
(A) such record was made, at or near the time of the occurrence
of the matters set forth, by (or from information transmitted
by) a person with knowledge of those matters;
(B) such record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted
business activity;
(C) the business activity made such a record as a regular practice;
and
(D) if such record is not the original, such record is a duplicate
of the original;
unless the source of information or the method or circumstances
of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.
(2) A foreign certification under this section shall authenticate such
record or duplicate.
(b) At the arraignment or as soon after the arraignment as practi-
cable, a party intending to offer in evidence under this section a
foreign record of regularly conducted activity shall provide written
notice of that intention to each other party. A motion opposing
admission in evidence of such record shall be made by the opposing
party and determined by the court before trial. Failure by a party to
file such motion before trial shall constitute a waiver of objection to
such record or duplicate, but the court for cause shown may grant
relief from the waiver.
(c) As used in this section, the term-
(1) "foreign record of regularly conducted activity" means a mem-
orandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts,
events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, maintained in a foreign
country;
(2) "foreign certification" means a written declaration made and
signed in a foreign country by the custodian of a foreign record of
regularly conducted activity or another qualified person that, if falsely
made, would subject the maker to criminal penalty under the laws of
that country; and
(3) "business" includes business, institution, association, profession,
occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for
profit.
18 U.S.C. § 3505 (1988).
6. Uniform Rule of Evidence 902(11) provides:
Rule 902. Self-authentication.
Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to ad-
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it had been adopted by Alaska,8 Kentucky, 9 and Texas.' 0 A number
missibility is not required with respect to the following:
(11) Certified records of regularly conducted activity. The original
or a duplicate of a record of regularly conducted activity, within the
scope of Rule 803(6), which the custodian thereof or another qualified
individual certifies (i) was made, at or near the time of the occurrence
of the matters set forth, by (or from information transmitted by) a
person with knowledge of those matters, (ii) is kept in the course of
the regularly conducted activity, and (iii) was made by the regularly
conducted activity as a regular practice, unless the sources of infor-
mation or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack
of trustworthiness; but a record so certified is not self-authenticating
under this subsection unless the proponent makes an intention to offer
it known to the adverse party and makes it available for inspection
sufficiently in advance of its offer in evidence to provide the adverse
party with a fair opportunity to challenge it. As used in this subsection,
"certifies" means, with respect to a domestic record, a written dec-
laration under oath subject to the penalty of perjury and, with respect
to a foreign record, a written declaration signed in a foreign country
which, if falsely made, would subject the maker to criminal penalty
under the laws of that country. The certificate relating to a foreign
record must be accompanied by a final certification as to the genu-
ineness of the signature and official position (i) of the individual
executing the certificate or (ii) of any foreign official who certifies
the genuineness of signature and official position of the executing
individual or is the last in a chain of certificates that collectively
certify the genuineness of signature and official position of the exe-
cuting individual. A final certification must be made by a secretary
of embassy [sic] or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or
consular agent of the United States, or a diplomatic or consular
official of the foreign country who is assigned or accredited to the
United States.
UNIF. R. EVID. 902(11).
7. The changes made in Maryland Rule 5-902(a)(11) and (b) from the text of the
Uniform Rule are shown below. They are of style and clarification only, such
as the addition of the word "business" before "activity," see MD. RULE 5-
803(b)(6) (defining "business"), and the parallel use of the phrase "made and
kept" in subsections (a)(l l)(B) and (C):
(11) Certified Records of Regularly Conducted Business Activity
The original or a duplicate of a record of regularly conducted
business activity, within the scope of Rule 5-803(b)(6), which the
custodian thereof or another qualified individual certifies (A) (i) was
made, at or near the time of the occurrence of the matters set forth,
by (or from information transmitted by) a person with knowledge of
those matters, (B) (ii) is made and kept in the course of the regularly
conducted business activity, and (C) fiii) was made and kept by the
regularly conducted business activity as a regular practice, unless the
sources of information or the method of circumstances of preparation
indicate lack of trustworthiness; but a record so certified is not self-
authenticating under this subsection unless the proponent makes an
intention to offer it known to the adverse party and makes it available
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of evidentiary codifications from other states permit the foundation
of the hearsay exception to be established by affidavit for certain
categories of business records."
This Article will examine Maryland Rule 5-902(a)(11), its "leg-
islative" history, and the issues that are likely to arise under it.
Some questions in this regard have already been raised by Judge
for inspection sufficiently in advance of its offer in evidence to provide
the adverse party with a fair opportunity to challenge it.
(12) ...
(b) As used in this sibseetio Rule, "certifies", "certificate", or
"certification" means, with respect to a domestic record or public
document, a written declaration under oath subject to the penalty of
perjury and, with respect to a foreign record or public document, a
written declaration signed in a foreign country which, if falsely made,
would subject the maker to criminal penalty under the laws of that
country. The certificate relating to a foreign record or public document
must be accompanied by a final certification as to the genuineness of
the signature and official position (i) (1) of the individual executing
the certificate or (i) (2) of any foreign official who certifies the
genuineness of signature and official position of the executing indi-
vidual or is the last in a chain of certificates that collectively certify
the genuineness of signature and official position of the executing
individual. A final certification must may be made by a secretary of
an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular
agent of the United States, or a diplomatic or consular official of the
foreign country who is assigned or accredited to the United States.
8. ALASKA R. EVID. 902(11) (effective January 15, 1988).
9. Ky. R. EVID. 902(11) (effective July 1, 1992).
10. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 902(10); TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 902(10) (effective January
1, 1988). The Texas rules are consistent with prior Texas statutes. See Gregory
P. Joseph & Stephen A. Saltzburg, Evidence in America: The Federal Rules
in the States, Rule 902 § 63.2, at 4 (1987).
11. For example, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Tennessee, and Wisconsin, like Mary-
land, see infra note 76, have special provisions for proof of hospital records.
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 52.320-.375 (Michie 1986); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. &
R. §§ 2306 (1991) & 4518(c) (McKinney Supp. 1995); Omo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2317.422 (Baldwin Supp. 1993) (see infra note 234 for cases discussing this
statute); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-11-301 to 411 (1992 & Supp. 1994); Wis. R.
EVID., WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 908.03(6m), 909.02(11) (West 1993 & Supp. 1994).
Nevada has similar provisions for proof of hotel and casino records. NEv.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 52.405-.435 (Michie 1986); see also N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L.
& R. 4518(b)-(e) (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1995) (hospital bills, library records,
and reports of DNA and blood genetic marker tests). California's statute
initially covered only hospital records but now applies to all business records.
See infra note 74.
The state of Washington provides for presumptive authentication of a
number of documents, including hospital records, medical and pharmaceutical
bills, and estimates for property repairs, after notice, absent objection by the
opponent. WASH. R. EvtD. 904. If the court finds an objection to have been
unreasonable, it may order the objecting party to pay expenses. Id.
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Chasanow, of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in his partial
dissent to the Order adopting the new Rules.' 2 With regard to what
will constitute an adequate certification under Maryland Rule 5-
902(a)(1 1), this Article will analyze cases that have arisen under 18
U.S.C. § 3505' 3 and the Texas rule.14 It also will review Maryland
cases recognizing that, even before the adoption of the Maryland
Rules of Evidence, some documents could be qualified as business
records without the need for a testifying witness.
The Article next will evaluate the constitutionality of Rule 5-
902(a)(11) under the Confrontation Clause 5 and the Due Process
Clause.' 6 Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 7 lower
federal court cases 8 upholding 18 U.S.C. § 3505, and a Maryland
court of appeals decision 9 upholding an analogous statute, support
the conclusion that the Rule is constitutional.
Maryland Rule 5-902(a)(11) concerns only the issue of authen-
tication. The Rule's creation of an alternative method of authenti-
cation of business records should not affect the courts' analysis of
problems regarding hearsay, multiple hearsay, and opinion evidence.
If, under the pre-Rules law,20 a business record would have been
admissible in its entirety once the hearsay exception foundation was
laid, then Rule 5-902(a)(11) may be used to admit a business record
without the need to have any witness testify at trial concerning the
record. But the same questions as to double or multiple hearsay
and opinions will persist that existed under the pre-Rules law.
For example, there still will be a question as to which opinions
contained within a business record will be admissible as substantive
proof under the exception to the hearsay rule for business records,
even when the person who expressed those opinions does not testify
at the trial or proceeding. On this point, this Article will examine
pre-Maryland Rules of Evidence cases, 2' as well as cases 22 from
other jurisdictions construing rules comparable to Maryland Rule
5-803(b)(6), and will propose standards for civil and criminal cases. 23
12. 21 Md. Reg., issue 1, Part II, P-1-3 (1994) (Rules Order of Dec. 15, 1993);
see infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
13. 18 U.S.C. § 3505 (1988).
14. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 902(10); TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 902(10).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
16. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
17. See, e.g., infra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 149.
19. See infra notes 173-92 and accompanying text.
20. Prior to the enactment of the Maryland Rules of Evidence in 1994, Maryland's
evidentiary rules were based primarily in common law.
21. See infra part VII.B.
22. See infra part VIII.B.
23. See infra part VIII.B.I.-2.
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Finally, the Article will comment that Rule 5-902(a)(1 1) does
not appear to extend to proof of the absence of business records
or of the absence of entries in those records. Rule 5-1006-proof
by summary-may provide a useful alternative in such a situation.
An appendix will set forth suggested forms for certificates that
might be used under Rule 5-902(a)(1 1).
II. MARYLAND RULE 5-902(a)(1 1)
A. Self-Authentication In General: Maryland Rule 5-902
Like its federal counterpart, Maryland Rule 5-902 as a whole
is designed to eliminate the need to call foundation witnesses for
evidence that is so likely to be authentic that a requirement of
testimony to sufficiently show authenticity to justify admission
would squander judicial time and litigants' resources. The federal
Advisory Committee's note summarized the purpose of the analo-
gous Federal Rule of Evidence 902 as follows:
Case law and statutes have, over the years, developed a
substantial body of instances in which authenticity is taken
as sufficiently established for purposes of admissibility
without extrinsic evidence to that effect, sometimes for
reasons of policy but perhaps more often because practical
considerations reduce the possibility of unauthenticity to a
very small dimension. The present rule collects and incor-
porates these situations, in some instances expanding them
to occupy a larger area which their underlying considera-
tions justify. In no instance is the opposite party foreclosed
from disputing authenticity.24
The stem of Maryland Rule 5-902(a) provides: "Except as otherwise
provided by statute, extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition
precedent to admissibility is not required with respect to the follow-
ing .... ",25 The Rule then lists twelve categories including, for
example, certified copies of public records.2 6
Thus, just as under pre-Title 5 Maryland law, 27 a certified copy
of a public record is sufficiently self-authenticating for the court
not to exclude it for lack of authenticity. If the record is to be
24. FED. R. EVID. 902 (Advisory Committee's Note) (emphasis added).
25. MD. RULE 5-902(a).
26. MD. RULE 5-902(a)(4).
27. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-905(b) (1989); see LYNN McLAIN,
MARYLAND EVIDENCE: STATE AND FEDERAL § 902.2, at 509-11 n.1 (1987 &
Supp. 1994) [hereinafter MARYLAND EVIDENCE].
[Vol. 24
Self-Authentication of Business Records
excluded, it would be for another reason, such as lack of relevance 28
or failure to fall within the applicable hearsay exception. 29 If an
opposing party argues that the certified copy is unauthentic, gen-
erating an issue of lack of authenticity so that reasonable minds
could differ as to that question, then the court must instruct the
jury that ultimately it must decide whether the exhibit in question
is authentic.30
B. Self-Authentication of Business Records: Maryland Rule 5-
902 (a) (11)
The same analysis that applies to certified copies of public
records applies to evidence offered as self-authenticating certified
originals or duplicates of business records under Maryland Rule 5-
902(a)(11). That Rule provides:
Rule 5-902 Self-Authentication
(a) Generally -Except as otherwise provided by statute,
extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent
to admissibility is not required with respect to the follow-
ing:
(11) Certified Records of Regularly Conducted Business
Activity-The original or a duplicate of a record of regu-
larly conducted business activity, within the scope of Rule
5-803(b)(6), which the custodian or another qualified in-
dividual certifies (A) was made, at or near the time of the
occurrence of the matters set forth, by (or from informa-
tion transmitted by) a person with knowledge of those
matters, (B) is made and kept in the course of the regularly
conducted business activity, and (C) was made and kept
by the regularly conducted business activity as a regular
practice, unless the sources of information or the method
or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustwor-
thiness; but a record so certified is not self-authenticating
under this subsection unless the proponent makes an in-
tention to offer it known to the adverse party and makes
it available for inspection sufficiently in advance of its
offer in evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair
opportunity to challenge it."
28. See MD. RULES 5-401 to 5-403.
29. See MD. RULE 5-803(b)(8).
30. MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 2.902.1(a); see MD.RULES 5-
104(b), 5-901(a); MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 27, § 104.2.
31. MD. RULE 5-902(a)(11).
19941
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In practice, counsel often stipulate to the authenticity of an
opposing party's documentary evidence. Absent a waiver of a pos-
sible objection by an opponent, either by such a stipulation,"2 by
an admission in response to a request for admissions,33 or by failing
to note a pre-trial objection when required to do so by the court,3 4
the proponent of business records bears the burdens of (1) satisfying
the fact-finder that the records are authentic, that is, they are what
they appear to be, and (2) satisfying the trial judge that they fall
within the hearsay exception for business records.
Under Maryland's evidence rules, litigants may continue to
authenticate the documents by the trial testimony of a "person with
knowledge" 35 who recognizes the records-either a "custodian or
other qualified witness." '3 6 Similarly, litigants may continue to lay
the foundation for the business records hearsay exception through
the trial testimony of a "custodian or other qualified witness," or,
as case law provides, by circumstantial evidence, if appropriate.37
Maryland Rule 5-902(a)(11) provides a third alternative. It
makes copies or originals of business records self-authenticating if
they are certified as such by "either the custodian or another
qualified individual." 3 This process of certification essentially tracks
the requirements for the business records exception to the hearsay
rule, codified in Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(6).3 9 Such a certification
also establishes a prima facie foundation for the business records
exception. The Rule applies to both foreign and domestic records.
"Certifies" is defined in Rule 5-902(b) as follows:
As used in this Rule, "certifies", "certificate", or "cer-
tification" means, with respect to a domestic record or
public document, a written declaration under oath subject
to the penalty of perjury and, with respect to a foreign
record or public document, a written declaration signed in
a foreign country which, if falsely made, would subject
32. See MD. RULES 2-504.2(b)(6), 3-504(b)(6).
33. See MD. RULES 2-424, 2-504.2(b)(6), 3-504(b)(6).
34. See MD. RULE 2-504.2(b)(8) (quoted in part infra note 194); MD. RULE 5-
902(a)(12).
35. MD. RULE 5-901(b)(1).
36. The phrase "custodian or other qualified witness" is used in the federal hearsay
exception for business records. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
37. See infra text accompanying notes 93-97.
38. This is the same group of persons who may testify to lay the foundation for
the hearsay exception under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6). See FED. R.
EVID. 803(6) (foundation for business records hearsay exception to be proven
"by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness"); see also infra
part V (18 U.S.C. § 3505 has been interpreted as the author interprets Maryland
Rule 5-902(a)( 11)).
39. See infra note 90 for the text of Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(6).
[Vol. 24
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the maker to criminal penalty under the laws of that
country. The certificate relating to a foreign record or
public document must be accompanied by a final certifi-
cation as to the genuineness of the signature and official
position (1) of the individual executing the certificate or
(2) of any foreign official who certifies the genuineness of
signature and official position of the executing individual
or is the last in a chain of certificates that collectively
certify the genuineness of signature and official position
of the executing individual. A final certificate may be made
by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice consul, or consular agent of the United States,
or a diplomatic or consular official of the foreign country
who is assigned or accredited to the United States. 40
In order to prevent surprise or unfairness, Rule 5-902(a)(11)
provides that the proponent of the evidence must give advance
notice to the adverse party of the intent to authenticate a record
via 5-902(a)(11). Although the Rule does not specify how much
notice should be given, it provides that the proponent must give
the adverse party sufficient opportunity to inspect the record so as
to be afforded a "fair opportunity to challenge it." ' 4' This require-
ment makes clear that last minute notice would be inadequate.
Careful counsel should give as much notice as feasible. 42 Notice
could be accomplished through a request for admissions both as to
authenticity and as to qualification under the business records
hearsay exception. If the time period before a response was due
was adequate to provide an ample opportunity to inspect under the
circumstances of the case, such notice should suffice under the Rule.
Just as with all categories of self-authenticating evidence under
Rule 5-902, the adverse party is not precluded from disputing
authenticity. 43 If the opponent merely generates a question of au-
40. MD. RULE 5-902(b).
41. MD. RULE 5-902(a)(l 1). Compliance with these provisions may be problematic
in small claims actions in the district court due to time constraints.
42. See United States v. Tedder, 801 F.2d 1437, 1448-49 & n.9 (4th Cir. 1986)
(government provided notice required by 18 U.S.C. § 3505 on day previously
scheduled for pretrial motions, 14 days after § 3505 went into effect; under
circumstances, notice was adequate, although government could have been
more diligent); Paul W. Grimm, New Rule Covers Authentication of Business
Records, 10 MD. LITIGATOR 1, 3 (1994) ("Prudent lawyers who wish to take
advantage of the self-authentication provisions of Rule 5-902(a)(1 1) will provide
the written notice required by the rule well in advance of the trial to avoid a
dispute at trial over whether sufficient notice was given.").
43. See MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 2.902.4(a); 2 MCCORMICK,
supra note 5, § 228, at 56 ("Presumptive authenticity, as provided for by [FED.
19941
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thenticity as to evidence that the court has admitted, as to which
reasonable minds may differ, the records will be sufficiently au-
thenticated to be admitted, and authenticity will become an issue
for the finder of fact. 44
Most importantly, however, Rule 5-902(a)(1 1) contains the same
safety valve as does Rule 5-803(b)(6): The record will not qualify
for the benefits of Rule 5-902(a)(1 1) if the sources of information
or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of
trustworthiness. 45 If a party persuades the court that the records in
question lack trustworthiness, they will not be self-authenticating.
In that event, unless the. trustworthiness required for the hearsay
exception is shown by a live witness's testimony, the record will
not be admissible under Rule 5-803(b)(6).
III.THE "LEGISLATIVE" HISTORY OF MARYLAND RULE
5-902(a)(1 1)
A. The Evidence Subcommittee's Consideration of the Uniform
Rule
During its consideration of both the business records exception
to the hearsay rule 46 and the rule regarding self-authentication,4 7 the
Evidence Subcommittee of the Maryland Court of Appeals Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure was apprised 48 that
a 1986 amendment to the Uniform Rules of Evidence 49 had added
R. EVID. 9021, does not preclude evidentiary challenge of the genuineness of
the offered writing, but simply serves to obviate the necessity of preliminary
authentication by the proponent to secure admission. This common sense
approach was long overdue . . ").
44. MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 2.902.1(a); see MD. RULES 5-
104(b), 5-901(a); see also MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 27, § 104.2, at 70-
71; MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, §§ 2.104.4(b), 2.901.4(a).
45. MD. RULES 5-803(b)(6), 5-902(a)( 11); see infra text accompanying notes 109-
10.
46. MD. RULE 5-803(b)(6).
47. MD. RULE 5-902.
48. Memorandum from Lynn McLain on Rule 803, to Una Perez, Esq., for
distribution to the Evidence Subcommittee, pp. 13-15 (June 18, 1991) [here-
inafter Memorandum] (on file with author).
49. Uniform Rule of Evidence 902(11) provides:
(11) Certified records of regularly conducted activity. The original or
a duplicate of a record of regularly conducted activity, within the
scope of Rule 803(6), which the custodian thereof or another qualified
individual certifies (i) was made, at or near the time of the occurrence
of the matters set forth, by (or from information transmitted by) a
person with knowledge of those matters, (ii) is kept in the course of
the regularly conducted activity, and (iii) was made by the regularly
[Vol. 24
19941 Self-Authentication of Business Records
a provision for the self-authentication of certified copies of business
records that did not appear in the Federal Rules of Evidence, but
had been followed verbatim by Alaska and in substance by Texas.
The Uniform Rules' Commissioners' Comment to the 1986
amendment, which was reported to the Evidence Subcommittee, 0
explains:
Subsection 11 is new. and embodies a revised version of
the recently enacted federal statute dealing with foreign
records of regularly conducted activity, 18 U.S.C. § 3505.
Under the federal statute, authentication by certification is
limited to foreign business records and to use in criminal
proceedings. This subsection broadens the federal provision
so that it includes domestic as well as foreign records and
is applicable in. civil as well as criminal cases. Domestic
records are presumably no less trustworthy and certification
of such records can more easily be challenged if the op-
ponent of the evidence chooses to do so. As to the federal
statute's limitation to criminal matters, ordinarily the rules
are more strictly applied in such cases, and the rationale
of trustworthiness is equally applicable in civil matters.
Moreover, the absence of confrontation concerns in civil
actions militates in favor of extending the rule to the civil
side as well.
conducted activity as a regular practice, unless the sources of infor-
mation or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack
of trustworthiness; but a record so certified is not self-authenticating
under this subsection unless the proponent makes an intention to offer
it known to the adverse party and makes it available for inspection
sufficiently in advance of its offer in evidence to provide the adverse
party with a fair opportunity to challenge it. As used in this subsection,
"certifies" means, with respect to a domestic record, a written dec-
laration under oath subject to the penalty of perjury and, with respect
to a foreign record, a written declaration signed in a foreign country
which, if falsely made, would subject the maker to criminal penalty
under the laws of that country. The certificate relating to a foreign
record must be accompanied by a final certification as to the genu-
ineness of the signature and official position (i) of the individual
executing the certificate or (ii) of any foreign official who certifies
the genuineness of signature and official position of the executing
individual or is the last in a chain of certificates that collectively
certify the genuineness of signature and official position of the exe-
cuting individual. A final certification must be made by a secretary
of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular
agent of the United States, or a diplomat, or consular official of the
foreign country who is assigned or accredited to the United States.
UNIF. R. EvID. 902(11).
50. Memorandum, supra note 48, at 14-15.
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The rule requires that the certified record be made
available for inspection by the adverse party sufficiently in
advance of the offer to permit the opponent a fair oppor-
tunity to challenge it. A fair opportunity to challenge the
offer may require that the proponent furnish the opponent
with a copy of the record in advance of its introduction
and that the opponent have an opportunity to examine,
not only the record offered, but any other records or
documents from which the offered record was procured or
to which the offered record relates. That is a matter not
addressed by the rule but left to the discretion of the trial
judge. 5'
The Evidence Subcommittee proposed the adoption of the substance
of Uniform Rule of Evidence 902(11), although for reasons of style
and clarity it decided to carve out the definition of "certifies" by
breaking the Rule into two subparts.5 2 Subpart (a) lists the various
methods of self-authentication; subpart (b) defines "certifies."
B. The Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure
After a meeting on May 14, 1993, when proposed Rule 5-902
was considered, 3 the Rules Committee proposed the adoption of
the Subcommittee draft of Rule 5-902(a)(11) nearly verbatim, the
only change being the deletion of the word "thereof" after the
word "custodian." 5 4 The Rules Committee also made one change,
for purposes of clarity, to proposed Rule 5-902(b), expanding the
definition from that of "certifies" to include also "certificate" and
"certification. "55
C. Policy Considerations
The policy reasons driving the Rule are primarily economic-
saving of time and money for the courts admitting proof of business
51. UNIF. R. EVID. 902(11) (Commissioners' Comment) (emphasis added).
52. Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure,
Proposed Title 5 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure: Evidence, Subcommittee
Draft, Spring 1992, at 118-21.
53. Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure,
minutes of May 14, 1993, meeting, at 16-20.
54. Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure,
125th Report, Proposed Title 5 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure: Evidence,
July 1993, at 139-40.
55. Id. at 141-42.
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records5 6 and for the parties offering them.5 7 Any achievement of
judicial economy, even a limited one such as this, is significant, 58
56. See Grimm, supra note 42, at I ("There is no more tedious chore during trial
than to go through the process of laying a foundation for business records
through the testimony of a sponsoring witness. Judges always seem impatient
with the time required to lay the foundation, witnesses called only to authen-
ticate documents are irritated by the intrusion into their time, and juries find
the process mind-numbing. Newly adopted Maryland Rule 5-902(a)(1 1) will
allow trial lawyers to avoid most of this aggravation through the exercise of a
little advance planning before trial."). See generally 2 MCCORMICK, supra note
5, § 218, at 38 ("[Rjequiring proof of what may correctly be assumed true in
99 out of 100 cases is at best time-consuming and expensive. At the worst, the
requirement will occasionally be seen to produce results which are virtually
indefensible. Thus, while traditional requirements of authentication admittedly
furnish some slight obstacles to the perpetration of fraud or occurrence of
mistake in the presentation of writings, it has frequently been questioned
whether these benefits are not outweighed by the time, expense, and occasional
untoward results entailed by the traditional negative attitude toward authenticity
of writings.") (citations omitted).
Apparently, a concern for judicial economy was also the motivating force
behind the somewhat similar preexisting Maryland Rules 2-510(g) and 3-510(g),
regarding certification of hospital records. See infra notes 74-76 and accom-
panying text; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 142(c) (1992) (discussed infra
text accompanying notes 173-89).
57. See Grimm, supra note 42, at 5 ("[Ilt is clear that Rule 5-902(a)(11) makes
life much easier for attorneys who are sufficiently [knowledgeable] to take
advantage of its benefits.").
58. The concern for judicial economy is neither new nor isolated; it affects many
of the rules of evidence generated by the common law and now codified. See,
e.g., MD. RULE 5-403 (stating that a trial court in its discretion may exclude
evidence when "its probative value is substantially outweighed . . . , by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence"); MD. RULE 5-608(a)(3)(B) (precluding character witnesses
from testifying on direct examination to the specific instances that led to their
opinion, or to the reputation, of another person); MD. RULE 5-608(b) (pre-
cluding use of extrinsic evidence to prove impeaching "prior bad acts" not
having resulted in conviction of witness); MD. RULE 5-1003 (permitting proof
of contents of important writing by its duplicate, "unless (1) a genuine question
is raised as to the authenticity of the original or (2) in the circumstances it
would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original"); MD. RULE 5-
1004(d) (permitting proof of the contents of a writing by less than the "best
evidence," when the writing is not closely related to a controlling issue in the
case); see also MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 27, §§ 403.1, 608.1-.2, 1001.1-
.4, 1004.1; cf. Austin v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 380, 381 (1994) (per curiam)
("[Tihough indigent defendants pursuing appeals as of right have a constitu-
tional right to a brief filed on their behalf by an attorney, that right does not
extend to forums for discretionary review. . . . Circuit councils should, if
necessary, revise their Criminal Justice Plans so [as to] allow for relieving a
lawyer of the duty to file a petition for certiorari if the petition would present
only frivolous claims.") (citations omitted).
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particularly when numerous reports bemoan the overload for judges59
and the consequent backlog for litigants. 60 This acceleration is
especially important to civil plaintiffs6I as opposed to criminal
defendants with a constitutional guarantee to a speedy trial. 6 No
doubt inspired by the same concerns, a local rule of the United
States District Court for the District of Maryland simply provides
for the automatic admission into evidence of an exhibit mentioned
by counsel at trial, unless an objection is made. 63
D. Public Comment
The Rules Committee's draft of Maryland's evidence rules was
published for public comment in July 1993.64 Only one comment
was received regarding proposed Rule 5-902(a)(11), and that con-
cerned its application to computerized records, regarding the scope
of opportunity to inspect. 65
E. The Court of Appeals of Maryland
The court of appeals held two public hearings on the proposed
evidence rules. At the first hearing, on October 4, 1993, Judge
59. See, e.g., Committee on Long Range Planning, Judicial Conference of the
United States, Proposed Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts (Mar. 1995)
(containing proposals, inter alia, to curtail federal jurisdiction, so as to reduce
the strain on the federal courts) (on file with author). Increased mediation in
civil cases has succeeded in cutting the backlog in Baltimore City's circuit
court. See Jay Apperson, Volunteer Lawyers Help Erase Circuit Court Backlog
Reception Is Held To Say Thank You, THE SUN (Balt.), Oct. 29, 1993, at 3B.
60. See, e.g., Panel Proposes Limiting Access to Federal Courts to Ease Rising
Caseload, THE SUN (Bait.), Dec. 5, 1994, at 8A ("Without hiring new judges,
delays would grow intolerably.... In the current climate, Congress is unlikely
to provide the money needed for judicial hiring and budgets to keep pace with
rising caseloads.").
61. Both the prospect of delay and increased up-front litigation costs for plaintiffs
also translate to better settlement leverage for defendants.
62. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; MD. CODE ANN., CONST. Decl. of Rts. art. 21 (1981).
Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights contains an analogous
provision regarding civil cases. MD. CODE ANN., CONST. Decl. of Rts. art. 19
(1981).
63. Local Rule 107(5)(b) of the United States District Court of Maryland provides:
b. ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE.
Unless otherwise ordered by the Court or unless counsel requests
that a particular exhibit be marked for identification only, whenever
an exhibit number is first mentioned by counsel during the examination
of a witness at trial, the exhibit shall be deemed to be admitted into
evidence unless opposing counsel then asserts an objection to it.
U.S. DIST. CT. OF MD. LOCAL RULE 107(5)(b).
64. 20 Md. Reg., issue 15, P-I to P-38 (July 23, 1993).
65. Letter from Professor Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Villanova Law School to Sandra
F. Haines, Esq. (Sept. 13, 1993) (urging that providing access to output alone
would be insufficient) (on file with Rules Committee) (on file with author).
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Chasanow made several comments regarding proposed Rule 5-
803(b)(6). He expressed concern that clause (A) could be read to
permit the qualification, as part of business records, of opinions
rendered belatedly, but then recorded promptly. He also remarked
that, because of proposed Rule 5-902(a)(11), a proponent might not
need a live witness to qualify records as business records, but under
proposed Rule 5-803(b)(7), the proponent would need a witness to
testify to the absence of business records. 66
In a letter to the members of the court of appeals, dated
October 29, 1993, with a memorandum attached, Chief Judge
Wilner of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland summarized
and responded to a number of the questions that had been raised
at the October 4, 1993, hearing. At its second open hearing, on
November 18, 1993, the court of appeals voted, inter alia, to keep
the word "opinions" in the introductory provision of Rule 5-
803(b)(6), but in response to Judge Chasanow's concern, to delete
the words "or opinion" in 5-803(b)(6)(A). The Rule also was
amended so as to employ the phrases "made and kept" and "make
and keep" throughout. A conforming amendment was made to Rule
5-902(a)(11)(B) and (C) so that those parallel subsections also would
read "made and kept." No further amendments to Rule 5-902 were
made.
By Rules Order dated December 15, 1993, a majority of the
court of appeals adopted Title 5 of the Maryland Rules of Proce-
dure, Evidence. 67 Judge Eldridge dissented, as he opposed codifi-
cation of evidence rules. 68 Judge Chasanow, joined by Judge Bell,
although favoring adoption of the code, dissented from twelve of
the sixty-one rules. 69
Judge Chasanow's opinion explained that he dissented from
Rules 5-803 and 5-902 for the following reasons:
RULE 5-803
There are numerous changes, particularly in business and
official records, which may create interpretation problems
for attorneys and judges.
RULE 5-902
The most disturbing change to Federal Rule 902 is the
addition of Rule 5-902(a)(11) allowing for certification of
authenticity of business records. The rule ultimately may
do little damage since the "custodian or [other] qualified
66. Lynn McLain's personal notes taken at the October 4, 1993 hearing, Court of
Appeals, Annapolis, Md. (Oct. 4, 1993) (on file with author).
67. 21 Md. Reg., issue 1, Part I1, P-i (1994).
68. Id. (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
69. Id. (Chasanow, J., joined by Bell, J., dissenting in part).
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individual" must certify "under oath subject to the penalty
of perjury" that, among other things, the record "was
made at or near the time of the occurrence of the matters
set forth, by (or from information transmitted by) a person
with knowledge of these matters." . . . Unless the affiant
either prepared the record or witnessed the record being
prepared, I question how such a certification can ever be
made.70
This last comment raises a troublesome question about the appli-
cation of Rule 5-902(a)(11). If Judge Chasanow's suggested reading,
that "the affiant [must have] either prepared the record or witnessed
the record being prepared," prevails, the Rule will have little effect,
and its purpose will be frustrated. 7'
Maryland Rule 5-902(a)(11) tracks the language of the hearsay
exception for. business records as defined in Rule 5-803(b)(6), which
was intended to codify the prior Maryland case law. Consequently,
in an attempt to provide guidance to the trial judges applying Rule
5-902(a)(11), it becomes necessary to review pre-Title 5 Maryland
law that may be instructive, as well as other jurisdictions' case law
construing provisions similar to Rule 5-902(a)(11).
IV. PRE-TITLE 5 MARYLAND LAW ON
AUTHENTICATION AND ADMISSIBILITY OF BUSINESS
RECORDS UNDER THE BUSINESS RECORDS HEARSAY
EXCEPTION, REVISITED AFTER TITLE 5
Pre-Title 5 Maryland law did not always require that a witness
testify either to authenticate business records or to lay the foun-
dation for the hearsay exception.72
A. Authentication
Under pre-Title 5 Maryland law, the case law provided for
several alternative methods of authentication of business records.
Another method for authentication of hospital records was estab-
lished by two rules of procedure.
The closest pre-Title 5 analog to Rule 5-902(a)(11) in enacted
Maryland law73 is found in those two rules, Maryland Rules 2-
70. Id. at P-3.
71. Cf. United States v. Franks, 939 F.2d 600, 602-03 (8th Cir. 1991) ("A contrary
rule, requiring the testimony of the person who prepared the records, would
eviscerate the business records exception.").
72. Thus, Maryland dropped from its business records rule language in the federal
rule that appears to require testimony by "a custodian or other qualified
witness." See infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
73. See also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 142(c) (1992) (discussed infra text accom-
panying notes 173-89).
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510(g) and 3-510(g), applicable in civil cases in circuit court and
district court, respectively. Rules 2-510(g) and 3-510(g) became
effective July 1, 1984. 74 They provide that, in response to a sub-
poena, a hospital records' custodian's certificate declaring "that
[the accompanying records, or copies of records, delivered to the
clerk of the court] are the complete records for the patient for the
period designated in the subpoena and that the records are main-
tained in the regular course of business of the hospital"" "shall be
prima facie evidence of the authenticity of the records."
7 6
74. See PAUL V. NIEMEYER & LINDA M. SCHUETT, MARYLAND RULES COMMENTARY
at xiii (2d ed. 1992). A similar statutory scheme was adopted by California in
1959. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1560-65 (West 1966 & Supp. 1995) (formerly C.C.P.
§§ 1998-1998.5 added by 1959 CAL. STATS. ch. 1059, §§ 1-6, at 3102-04); see
CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 1998, 1998.1, 1998.2, 1998.3, 1998.4, 1998.5; Hospital
Records: Affidavits as Foundation and Admissibility of Copies 34 (Cal.) S.
BAR J. 667 (1959); James E. Ludlane, Subpoenas for Hospital Records, 32
L.A. B. BULL. 335 (1957). By amendment in 1969, the California statutes were
extended to all business records. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1560 (West Supp. 1995)
(as amended by 1969 CAL. STATS. ch. 199, § 2, at 484; Allee v. King, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 93, 101 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (unpublished). Both provisions are narrower
than the Maryland Rules, in that the California statutes require that the hospital
or business neither be a party to the action nor be "the place where any cause
of action is alleged to have arisen." CAL. EvID. CODE § 1560 (West Supp.
1995).
In 1989, an amendment to the California statute added the condition that
"the requirements of Section 1271 have been met." CAL. EVID. CODE § 1562
(as amended by 1989 CAL. STATS. ch. 1416, § 31). Section 1271 merely sets
forth the hearsay exception for business records. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1271
(West 1966). The statute continued to permit the records' admission into
evidence just as if the custodian had been present and testified to the matters
stated in the affidavit. E.g., In re Troy D., 263 Cal. Rptr. 869, 876 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989).
75. MD. RULES 2-510(a), 3-510(a).
76. MD. RULES 2-510(g), 3-510(g). The complete text of the pertinent subsections
reads as follows:
(g) Hospital Records.-A hospital served with a subpoena to produce
at trial records, including x-ray films, relating to the condition or
treatment of a patient may comply by delivering the records to the
clerk of the court that issued the subpoena at or before the time
specified for production. The hospital may produce exact copies of
the records designated unless the subpoena specifies that the original
records be produced. The records shall be delivered in a sealed
envelope labeled with the caption of the action, the date specified for
production, and the name and address of the person at whose request
the subpoena was issued. The records shall be accompanied by a
certificate of the custodian that they are the complete records for the
patient for the period designated in the subpoena and that the records
are maintained in the regular course of business of the hospital. The
certification shall be prima facie evidence of the authenticity of the
19941
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Absent such a rule, under the pre-Title 5 Maryland common
law, business records generally, including hospital records, were
authenticated" by a witness with knowledge of that fact 7 -usually
the records' custodian. 79 The records also could be authenticated
by circumstantial evidence. 0 If the records were produced by a
process or system, such as computer-generated records, the required
evidence of authentication was of the reliability of the system or
process .81
records.
Upon commencement of the trial, the clerk shall release the records
only to the courtroom clerk assigned to the trial. The courtroom clerk
shall return the records to the clerk promptly upon completion of
trial or at an earlier time if there is no longer a need for them. Upon
final disposition of the action the clerk shall return the original records
to the hospital but need not return copies.
When the actual presence of the custodian of medical records is
required, the subpoena shall so state.
MD. RULES 2-510(g), 3-510(g). The Rules recognize that the party issuing the
subpoena may desire the custodian's presence at the trial; if so, "the subpoena
shall so state." MD. RULEs 2-510(g), 3-510(g). Presumably, the opposing party
also is free to subpoena the custodian. Cf. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1564 (West
Supp. 1995) (as a result of the 1984 amendment, the statute is clear that
whether custodian's presence is required is "at the discretion of the requesting
party"); see also State v. Spikes, 423 N.E.2d 1122 (Ohio 1981) (Ohio hospital
records statute provides explicitly that opposing party may subpoena the
custodian).
No reported cases attacking the validity of Rules 2-510(g) or 3-510(g) have
been found, and apparently they have worked well in practice. Telephone
interview with Paul Bekman, Esq., and James Archibald, Esq. (Dec. 19, 1994).
Because hospital records are a subcategory of business records, the adoption
of Maryland Rule 5-902(a)(11) provides for an alternate, simpler way to certify
hospital records so that they will be self-authenticating. Court of Appeals
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, minutes of May 14,
1993, meeting, at 19-20 (comment of Linda Schuett, Esq.) (adoption of Rule
5-902(a)(11) obviates the need to authenticate hospital records via the more
detailed provisions of Rules 2-510 and 3-510). In practice, in any event, counsel
for both parties usually agree on what are the correct records and compile a
joint records extract for use at trial. Telephone interview with Paul Bekman,
Esq., (Dec. 19, 1994).
77. See generally MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 27, § 901.1.
78. See generally id. § 901.2.
79. See id. § 803(6).1, at 379 n.18.
80. Id. § 803(6).1, at 379 n.19; see infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text. Like
Federal Rule of Evidence 901, Maryland Rule 5-901(b) lists only illustrative
examples of authentication under the Rule; others may suffice. See, e.g.,
United States v. Hines, 717 F.2d 1481, 1491 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1214, cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1219 (1984); Bury v. Marietta Dodge, 692
F.2d 1335, 1338 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (finding sufficient a certified
affidavit by Federal Reserve Board division head that attached unofficial letters
by staff attorneys were accurate); Finance Co. of America v. Bankamerica
Corp., 493 F. Supp. 895, 900-01 (D. Md. 1980).
81. See MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 27, § 803(6).1, at 378 n.12, § 901.12, at
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B. The Hearsay Rule
Once there was sufficient evidence of authentication to enable
a reasonable fact-finder to determine that the records were what
they purported to be, 2 their proponent moved on to other hurdles,
including those of relevance 83 and the hearsay rule.14 In order for
the records to be admitted to prove the truth of the facts contained
in them, they must fall within an exception (or, in the case of
multiple hearsay, exceptions) 85 to the hearsay rule.
In order to qualify under the pre-Title 5 business records
exception to the hearsay rule, documents had to comply with section
10-101 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Mar-
yland Code.86 Section 10-101 was derived from the Commonwealth
Fund of New York's Model Act for Proof of Business Transac-
tions,8 '7 similar to the later Uniform Business Records as Evidence
499 n.3, § 901.21, at n.2 (Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule of
Evidence 901); see also United States v. Fendley, 522 F.2d 181, 185-86, 191
(5th Cir. 1975) (inadequate objection to computer printout) (Godbold, J.,
dissenting, would find reversible error in admission of printout absent laying
of foundation by witness to establish input accuracy, i.e., to "explain the
business operations pursuant to which information is received by A in regular
course of business, and in regular course of business passed on by him to B
(who may be a computer or a person or a combination of them) who, timely
and in regular course of business, makes a record"); see generally Phillip R.
Brockett, Evidence and Trial Advocacy: The Erosion of the Hearsay Objection
to Computer Generated Evidence, 26 CRIM. L. BULL. 357 (1990); see also infra
note 105.
82. MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 27, § 901.1.
83. See generally id. §§ 401.1 to 403.8.
84. See generally id. §§ 801.1 to 805.1.
85. See MD. RULE 5-805; MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, §§ 2.805.1-
.2; MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 27, § 805.1.
86. Section 10-101 provides:
(a) Definition of Business- "Business" includes business, profession,
and occupation of every kind.
(b) Admissibility-A writing or record made in the regular course of
business as a memorandum or record of an act, transaction, occur-
rence, or event is admissible to prove the act, transaction, occurrence,
or event.
(c) Time of making records-The practice of the business must be to
make such written records of its acts at the time they are done or
within a reasonable time afterwards.
(d) Lack of knowledge of maker-The lack of personal knowledge of
the maker of the written notice may be shown to affect the weight
of the evidence but not its admissibility.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-101 (1989).
87. See State v. Garlick, 313 Md. 209, 218, 545 A.2d 27, 31 (1988) (citing E.
MORGAN, CHAIRMAN, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: SOME PROPOSALS FOR ITS REFORM,
ch. 5, at 63 (1927)); Bethlehem-Sparrows Point Shipyard, Inc. v. Sherpenisse,
187 Md. 375, 380, 50 A.2d 256, 259-60 (1946); see generally 5 WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE § 1561a (1974).
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Act, which was superseded by the original Uniform Rule of Evidence
63(13).8 The Maryland statute, now "trumped" by the subsequent
adoption 9 of Rule 5-803(b)(6) 90 to the minor extent that it is
inconsistent with section 10-101, 91 was but one incarnation of the
business records hearsay exception that has broadened significantly
over the centuries since its inception as the "shop book rule."
92
The modern Maryland cases, codified by Rule 5-803(b)(6), are both
flexible and lenient with regard to how the foundation for business
records can be established.
1. No Across-the-Board Requirement of Testimonial Foundation
Although the foundation for the hearsay exception codified in
section 10-101 usually was laid by a custodian or other qualified
witness, several pre-Title 5 Maryland cases had held that testimonial
foundation evidence was not required, in that sometimes the court
might conclude from the circumstances and the nature of the
document involved that the document was made in the regular
88. UNIF. R. EvID. 63(B).
89. In the event of conflict, the more recent enactment prevails. See generally
NORMAN J. SINGER, 2 SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 23.09 (5th ed. 1994).
90. Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(6) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness:
(b) Other Exceptions
(6) Records of Regularly Conducted Business Activity-A memo-
randum, report, record, or data compilation of acts, events, condi-
tions, opinions, or diagnoses if (A) it was made at or near the time
of the act, event, or condition, or the rendition of the diagnosis, (B)
it was made by a person with knowledge or from information trans-
mitted by a person with knowledge, (C) it was made and kept in the
course of a regularly conducted business activity, and (D) the regular
practice of that business was to make and keep the memorandum,
report, record, or data compilation. A record of this kind may be
excluded if the source of information or the method or circumstances
of the preparation of the record indicate that the information in the
record lacks trustworthiness. In this paragraph, "business" includes
business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling
of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
MD. RULE 5-803(b)(6).
91. See MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 2.803.2, at 242-43.
92. See generally 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, §§ 285-286, 2.803.2 at 242-43; JACK
B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 803(6)[011
(1994); 5 WIGMORE, supra note 87, §§ 1517-1616; Glenn Weissenberger, Hear-
say: Business Records and Public Records, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 42 (1982).
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course of business. 93 For example, a letter to the court on an
organization's apparently official stationery was, under all of the
circumstances, qualified properly as a business record without a
testimonial foundation.9 4
Some of the federal cases also had reached similar results, 95
even though the federal courts had to circumvent the language of
the federal rule to do it, since Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6)
provides that the foundation be "shown by the testimony of the
custodian or other qualified witness." ' 96 In recognition of the ap-
parent conflict between this result and the language of the federal
rule, the drafters of Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(6) omitted the federal
rule's phrase: "all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or
93. See, e.g., Pine St. Trading Corp. v. Farrell Lines, 278 Md. 363, 372-74, 364
A.2d 1103, 1110-11 (1976) (FDA reports) (quoted with approval in Chapman
v. State, 331 Md. 448, 459-60, 628 A.2d 676, 682 (1993)); Morrow v. State,
190 Md. 559, 59 A.2d 325 (1948) (finding reversible error to exclude carbon
copy of sales receipt on printed letterhead and form from a South Carolina
gas station, offered by defendant); Beach v. State, 75 Md. App. 431, 435-39,
541 A.2d 1012, 1013-15 (1989) (letter on official stationery of a non-profit
organization); Newcomb v. Owens, 54 Md. App. 597, 604-05, 459 A.2d 1130,
1134-35 (1983) (hospital records furnished to court in response to subpoena);
Watkins v. State, 42 Md. App. 349, 355, 400 A.2d 464, 468 (1979) (commitment
record of an inmate); Thomas v. Owens, 28 Md. App. 442, 346 A.2d 662
(1975) (medical invoice sent by a government official pursuant to statute; as
alternative ground, evidence was admitted properly to corroborate other evi-
dence). But see United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding
that although even documentary evidence may suffice to lay the foundation
for the business records exception, it was reversible error to admit bank records
absent a demonstration that "the records were made contemporaneously with
the act the documents purport to record by someone with knowledge of the
subject matter, that they were made in the regular course of business, and that
such records were regularly kept by the business"; testifying witness had no
familiarity with bank's record keeping system and did not attest to any of the
other requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6)); United States v. Furst,
886 F.2d 558, 572 (3d Cir. 1989) (circumstantial evidence failed to authenticate
significant portions of records erroneously admitted), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1062 (1990).
94. Beach v. State, 75 Md. App. 431, 435-39, 541 A.2d 1012, 1013-15 (1989).
95. See, e.g., In re Department of Energy Stripper Well Exemption Litig. v. DOE,
874 F. Supp. 1161 (D. Kan. 1994) (the contents of the documents as well as
other matters of record were sufficient to establish their status as business
records kept in the course of regularly conducted business); see also 4 WEINSTEIN
& BERGER, supra note 92, 1 803(6)[021, at 803-199-200 & nn.5, 9 ("A foundation
for admissibility may at times be predicated on judicial notice of the nature
of the business and the nature of the records as observed by the court,
particularly in the case of bank statements and similar documents.").
96. FED. R. EVID. 803(6); see supra note 38; see also 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER,
supra note 92, 803-195-96.
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other qualified witness." 97 The intent behind the Maryland Rule
was to codify the pre-Title 5 Maryland case law.
Reaching a result similar to that of those pre-Title 5 cases
referred to above, a pre-Title 5 Maryland statute pertaining to proof
of bank records in bad check cases explicitly dispensed with the
need for a bank employee to testify at trial by providing for
admission of an employee's affidavit. 98
2. Limited Knowledge Needed by Witness Even When a
Testimonial Foundation Was Laid
Before Title 5, even when the foundation for the business
records hearsay exception had been laid by the testimony of a
custodian or other qualified witness, the cases in Maryland state
courts under section 10-101 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article of the Maryland Code99 were clear that the witness need not
have had first-hand knowledge of the event recorded, or of who
recorded it, or of who reported it.?° The witness need only have
had first-hand knowledge of and have been able to testify to the
routine preparation, as a part of the particular business organiza-
tion,10' by persons who were employees or a part of the business,,0 2
of such records as those being offered in evidence.
97. Compare MD. RULE 5-803(b)(6) (see supra note 90 for text of Rule) with FED.
R. EVID. 803(6) (see infra note 124 for text of Rule).
98. See infra note 175 (reciting part of Chapman v. State, 331 Md. 448, 628 A.2d
676 (1993)).
99. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-101 (1994); see supra note 86 for
text of statute.
100. See, e.g., Morrow v. State, 190 Md. 559, 59 A.2d 325 (1948); Beach v. State,
75 Md. App. 431, 541 A.2d 1012 (1989); Newcomb v. Owens, 54 Md. App.
597, 604-05, 459 A.2d 1130, 1134-35 (1983).
101. See, e.g., Killen v. Houser, 251 Md. 70, 246 A.2d 580 (1968) (testifying
custodian need not have been custodian at time records were made); Billman
v. Maryland Deposit Ins. Fund Corp., 88 Md. App. 79, 128-29, 593 A.2d 684,
708-09, cert. denied, 325 Md. 94, 599 A.2d 447 (1991); Newell v. Richards, 83
Md. App. 371, 574 A.2d 370 (1990), rev'd on other grounds, 323 Md. 717,
594 A.2d 1152 (1991); accord, e.g., Koenig v. Babka, 682 S.W.2d 96, 100
(Mo. App. 1984).
102. As a general matter, if it was apparent that the recorded statements were made
by someone who was not a part of the business, they did not qualify as
business records. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Kuhl, 296 Md. 446,
453-55, 463 A.2d 822, 827 (1983) (declarants must be a part of the business;
driver's statement recorded in police report did not qualify). The business
record statute could be used only when such an entry meets an additional test
of "necessity and circumstantial guaranty of trustworthiness." See, e.g., Evans
v. State, 304 Md. 487, 516-19, 499 A.2d 1261, 1276-78 (1985) (jail visitor's
card and hotel registration form were admissible as business records when they
were filled out in the regular course of business, even though the information
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The same was true in federal court under both Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(6)103 and its statutory precursor. 10 4 As explained in the
was entered by the visitors and guest; they were not offered as independent
substantive evidence, however, but as corroborating evidence), cert. denied,
478 U.S. 1010 (1986); Burroughs Int'l Co. v. Datronics Eng'r, 254 Md. 327,
347-48, 255 A.2d 341, 351 (1969); Wilson v. State, 44 Md. App. 318, 333-34,
408 A.2d 1058, 1066 (1979) (motel registration card was admitted properly as
a business record, when motel proprietor testified that when anyone registered
for a room she required them to complete a registration card which she then
kept as a matter of routine business procedure, and she identified the card as
one that had been made on the date in question, in the conduct of her regular
course of business).
As to the resolution of the same issue under the federal rule, compare,
e.g., United States v. Saint Prix, 672 F.2d 1077 (2d Cir. 1982) (no error to
admit hotel records showing individuals as guests when substantial evidence
corroborated them), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 992 (1982), and In re Ollag Constr.
Equip. Corp., 665 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1981) (financial statements made to
bank and relied on by it were admitted properly under Federal Rule of Evidence
803(b)(6)) with, e.g., United States v. Bell, 833 F.2d 272, 276 (lth Cir. 1987)
(government conceded that motel registration card signed with defendant's
name was inadmissible as business record, absent testimony that motel routinely
verified guests' identities; but card could be admitted to show that someone
using defendant's name and address had registered at motel and then could be
compared by jury with defendant's handwriting exemplar so as to determine
whether it was his signature), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1013 (1988), and United
States v. Lieberman, 637 F.2d 95, 99-101 (2d Cir. 1980) (hotel guest registration
card was inadmissible as business record but admitted properly as nonhearsay).
Whether to admit such evidence under Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(6) would
be determined by the court's analysis of the second sentence of subsection
(b)(6), read in light of cases such as Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Kuhl, 296
Md. 446, 463 A.2d 822 (1983), cited in the first paragraph of this footnote.
103. See, e.g., United States v. Arias-Villaneuva, 998 F.2d 1491, 1503 (9th Cir.
1993) (a "qualified witness," for purposes of Federal Rule 803(6), need not
"know 'who filled out the particular document and whether that person really
had knowledge of the events that were purportedly being reported in the
document'), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 537 (1993); United States v. Bland, 961
F.2d 123, 127 (9th Cir. 1992) ("The fact that [the witness] did not complete
Exhibit 13 [a form required by Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms to be filled out
by gun dealer] himself, and his failure to identify either the specific person
who completed Exhibit 13 or when that person completed it, do not keep
Exhibit 13 from being a business record. Frederickson's testimony that Exhibit
13 was ordinarily completed at the time of the purchase was sufficient to
satisfy the requirement that he establish that Exhibit 13 was completed 'at or
near the time of the incident recorded."') (citations omitted), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 170 (1992); United States v. Franks, 939 F.2d 600, 602-03 (8th Cir.
1991) ("Franks is simply incorrect that Rule 803(6) requires that the witness
testifying to the documents have personal knowledge of their preparation. ...
United States v. Keplinger, 776 F.2d 678, 693 (7th Cir. 1985) (Rule 803(6) does
not require that 'qualified witness' personally participate in creation of docu-
ments or 'even know who actually recorded the information'), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1183 (1986). A contrary rule, requiring the testimony of the person
who prepared the records, would eviscerate the business records exception. Id.
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Senate Judiciary Committee Report on Federal Rule of Evidence
803(6):
It is the understanding of the committee that the use of
the phrase "person with knowledge" [also used in Mary-
land Rules 5-803(b)(6) and 5-902(a)(11)] is not intended to
imply that the party seeking to introduce the memorandum,
report, record, or data compilation must be able to pro-
duce, or even identify, the specific individual upon whose
first-hand knowledge the memorandum, report, record or
data compilation was based. A sufficient foundation for
the introduction of such evidence will be laid if the party
seeking to introduce the evidence is able to show that it
was the regular practice of the activity to base such me-
morandums, [sic] reports, records, or data compilations
upon a transmission from a person with knowledge, e.g.,
in the case of the content of a shipment of goods, upon a
report from the company's receiving agent or, in the case
of a computer printout, upon a report from the company's
at 694.") (footnote and some citations omitted); United States v. Hathaway,
798 F.2d 902 (6th Cir. 1986) (under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6), witness
needs only knowledge of the record-keeping procedures); 4 WEINSTEIN &
BERGER, supra note 92, 803(6)[02], at 803-201-03 & nn.1l-12, 803(6)[04),
at 803-211-13; MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 27, § 803(6).2, at n.4; cf.
United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1574 (5th Cir. 1994) (no abuse of
discretion in admitting telephone records, when "defense counsel [had] ques-
tioned the records custodian called by the government to introduce the records
and elicited from her the admission that she did not know whether the records
had been maintained in their original form or altered in any way. The custodian
did, however, verify that the records were business records within the definition
of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) and that they were accurate when made.
Evaluating the admissibility of evidence, of course, is a matter within the sound
discretion of the trial court .... [Alny break in the chain of custody goes to
the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility .... "), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 113 (1995).
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1988). See, e.g., United States v. Fendley, 522 F.2d 181,
184-85 (5th Cir. 1975) (custodial witness properly laid foundation for business
records, even though he was not in the employ of the company making the
records at the time they were made; "Similarly, nothing in the Business Records
Act requires either that the foundation witness be able to personally attest to
the accuracy of the information contained in the document, or that he have
personally prepared the document. In fact, both these requirements have been
frequently held to have been specifically eliminated by 28 U.S.C. § 1732.");
United States v. Hay, 376 F. Supp. 264, 274 (D. Colo. 1974) (authentication
of Swiss bank records by deposition of Swiss bank employee sufficient under
28 U.S.C. § 1732, as incorporated by 18 U.S.C. §§ 3492-93, even though
deponent said he had no personal knowledge of the factual information in the
documents), aff'd, 527 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935
(1976).
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computer programmer or one who has knowledge of the
particular record system. In short, the scope of the phrase
"person with knowledge" is meant to be conterminous
with the custodian of the evidence or other qualified wit-
ness. The committee believes this represents the desired
rule in light of the complex nature of modern business
organizations. 5
The cases under the federal rule are consistent on this point with
the Maryland cases that were codified by Maryland's adoption of
Rule 5-803(b)(6).
3. Rule 5-902(a)(l1)
Maryland Rule 5-902(a)(11) expands the situations where live
testimony is unnecessary. The Rule, like similar rules in other
states,10 6 was intended to allow proof, by certification, of the same
facts that the certifying person would have needed to state in order
to lay the foundation for the hearsay exception at trial. The pre-
Title 5 Maryland cases are clear that the person laying the foun-
dation need not have had first-hand knowledge of the making of
the record or of the facts memorialized in it.107 If that person could
have sworn to the required foundation facts for the hearsay excep-
tion in court, that person can certify them, "under oath subject to
the penalty of perjury," under Rule 5-902(a)(11) and (b). To require
more would be to undo the Rule.
Maryland Rules 5-803(b)(6) and 5-902(a)(11), as well as Federal
Rule of Evidence 803(6), codify the safety valve that had existed at
common law. Under the Rules, the court may exclude a proffered
record as unreliable on the ground "that the information in the
record lacks trustworthiness,"'' 08 because of either (1) "the source
105. S. REP. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1974). But see Rudolph J.
Peritz, Computer Data and Reliability: A Call for Authentication of Business
Records Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 956 (1986)
(arguing that a greater foundation should be laid for computerized records, by
a testifying witness as to system reliability); see also supra note 81.
106. See infra part VI.
107. See supra note 101.
108. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 571 F.2d 1354 (5th Cir. 1978) (report made
to ATF, years after shipment of gun in question, failed to meet requirements
of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6)); United States v. Miller, 500 F.2d 751,
754 (5th Cir. 1974) (In order for records to be admissible as business records:
"(1) The records must be kept pursuant to some routine procedure designed
to assure their accuracy, (2) they must be created for motives that would tend
to assure accuracy (preparation for litigation, for example, is not such a
motive), and (3) they must not themselves be mere accumulations of hearsay
or uninformed opinion."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 839 (1986); see also infra
19941
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of information," such as someone outside the business; 10 9 or (2)
"the method or circumstances of the preparation" of the record,
such as a self-serving record, made after an accident, when the
motive to protect oneself in anticipated litigation might overcome
the usual motive to keep reliable records.110 If the trial court is
persuaded that the proffered record is unreliable, it should, in its
discretion, find that the record does not comply with Rule 5-
902(a)(11), and that it is not admissible under Rule 5-803(b)(6).
Unreliability, however, should not be found simply on the basis
that the certifier is not in court to testify"' or, for example, because
the record contains an obvious typographical error."l 2
note 121. Judge Weinstein and Professor Berger caution:
In short, if the judge finds that the record may be helpful to the
jurors and that they should be able to discount its untrustworthy
aspects with adequate instructions, the judge should admit the record.
Assessment of probative force should, whenever possible, be left for
the jury. The jury's function should not be reduced by excluding
relevant evidence unless the court is reasonably assured that the result
of the litigation will be less reliable if the evidence is revealed to the
jury.
Statements by professionals expressing their opinion on a relevant
matter should be excluded only in rare instances, particularly if the
expert is independent of any party, and especially if the reports have
been made available to the opposing party through discovery so that
rebuttal evidence can be prepared.
4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 92, 803(6)[07], at 803-233-34 (citations
omitted).
109. See supra note 102; see also 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 92, 803(6)[04].
110. See, e.g., Masterson v. Pennsylvania R.R., 182 F.2d 793, 796-97 (3d Cir.
1950); Weishaar v. Canestrale, 241 Md. 676, 686, 217 A.2d 525, 531 (1966)
(self-serving statement in anticipation of litigation was inadmissible); 4 WEIN-
STEIN & BERGER, supra note 92, 803(6)[03], [05], [07]. But cf. Chapman v.
State, 331 Md. 448, 464-65, 628 A.2d 576, 684-85 (1993) (bank's completion
of affidavit, for use by State in prosecution for passing bad check, was not
suspect: inter alia, "The bank has neither a position to advocate nor a stake
in the outcome of a criminal trial.").
111. See infra note 129.
112. Chapman v. State, 331 Md. 448, 453, 473-74, 628 A.2d 676, 678, 689-90 (1993)
("Upon review of the affidavit admitted at Chapman's trial we conclude that
the obvious single typographical error in the affidavit does not undermine the
reliability of its otherwise trustworthy hearsay. Unlike the report submitted in
Moon, the affidavit submitted at Chapman's trial was not marred by discrep-
ancies that undermined its reliability. The trial judge did not err in relying on
the dishonored check, which was in evidence, and concluding that the Affidavit
as to Account Status was trustworthy, despite the presence of an obviously
typographical error. The check was also in evidence. In accordance with banking
industry practice, each bank that handled the check stamped the back of the
instrument with a date on which it handled the check. The check Chapman
uttered contained two such stamps: (1) from the collecting bank in which Sears
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V. 18 U.S.C. § 3505
This Article's suggested interpretation of Maryland Rule 5-
902(a)(11) is supported by the law construing the most closely
analogous federal provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3505."13 Section 3505114
was enacted in 1984 in response to the sometimes impassable and,
at the very least, "cumbersome and expensive""' 5 barriers and
diplomatic brouhahas created by the American courts' insistence on
far more exacting proof of the accuracy and authenticity of foreign
business records than that required in foreign courts. 16 Congress
intended 18 U.S.C. § 3505 as "a simple, inexpensive substitute""' 7
for the prior, complicated procedures..
In light of this legislative history, the federal courts have
adopted a "liberal approach to the introduction of documents"
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3505.18 The courts have found that the
record custodian's attestation that he or she "will be subject to
criminal liability for a false certification affords the records suffi-
cient degree of reliability""19 for admission, despite the hearsay rule,
initially deposited the check dated April 20, 1988; and (2) the drawee bank
which received the check for presentment on April 21, 1988. It is clear that
the date of presentment in the affidavit was not substantive and was merely a
typographical error. The hearsay affidavit of the bank was admissible to
establish the status of Chapman's account.").
113. 18 U.S.C. § 3505 (1988).
114. Act Oct. 12, 1984, P.L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2165; see H.R. REP. No. 907, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3578-80
[hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.]. For the text of 18 U.S.C. § 3505 (1988), see
supra note 5.
115. H.R. REP., supra note 114, at 3 (quoted in United States v. Strickland, 935 F.2d
822, 830 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1036 (1992)); see Susan W. Brenner,
The Revival of "Trial by Affidavit": 18 U.S.C § 3505 and the Requirements of
the Confrontation Clause, 41 ARK. L. REv. 323, 324-27 (1988).
116. See H.R. REP., supra note 114, at 2; United States v. Hay, 376 F. Supp. 264
(D. Colo. 1974) (recounting saga of obtaining Swiss bank account records in
that case). This difficulty apparently had continued, despite the Treaty between
the United States and Switzerland on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters,
27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 (May 25, 1973).
117. H.R. REP., supra note 114, at 3 (quoted in United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d
1507, 1515 (l1th Cir. 1994)).
118. United States v. Bertoli, 854 F. Supp. 975, 1030 n.101 (D.N.J. 1994) (citing
United States v. Strickland, 935 F.2d 822, 830-31 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom., Moore v. United States, 502 U.S. 917 (1991)); United States v. Sturman,
951 F.2d 1466, 1489 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2964 (1992);
United States v. Gleave, 786 F. Supp. 258, 277-78 (W.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom., United States v. Knoll, 16 F.3d
1313 (2d Cir. 1994).
119. Gleave, 786 F. Supp. at 279; see also United States v. Hing Shair Chan, 680
F. Supp. 521, 526 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
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unless a showing of "untrustworthiness" is made. 20 Untrustwor-
thiness may be found, for example, when the documents were not
made at or near the time of the acts recorded.' 2'
The federal courts have been liberal in their decisions as to
what constitutes a sufficient certification under 18 U.S.C. § 3505.
The statute establishes five criteria for certificates:
1. Certificates should be signed by a person acting in the
capacity of custodian or by a person with knowledge of
matters [certified];
2. Certificates should indicate that the records were made
or received in the regular course of business;
3. Certificates should indicate the records were made as
a regular business practice;
4. Certificates should indicate records were made or re-
ceived at the time, or within a reasonable time thereafter,
of the recorded event;
5. [Certificates should indicate either that the record is
an original, or] [i]f such record is not an original, such
record is a duplicate of the original. 22
120. United States v. Bertoli, 854 F. Supp. 974, 1031 (D.N.J. 1994) (citing United
States v. Miller, 830 F.2d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
1033 (1988)); Gleave, 786 F. Supp. at 279.
121. United States v. Chu Kong Yin, 935 F. Supp. 990, 995-96 (9th Cir. 1990)
(finding documents listing and explaining defendant's arrests and convictions
in Hong Kong sufficiently authenticated under Federal Rules of Evidence
901(b)(l), (4), and (7); declarations on four of the documents complied with
18 U.S.C. § 3505); see also supra note 108.
122. 18 U.S.C. § 3505 (1988); see United States v. Bertoli, 854 F. Supp. 974, 1030
(D.N.J. 1994). For example, the Bertoli court found sufficient, under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3505, affidavits from one" Bechard, acting as the record custodian of Green-
shields, a Cayman Islands financial institution:
First, each affidavit stated that Bechard was Resident Manager of
Greenshields and that "as a result of [his] duties and responsibilities
[he was] aware of the manner in which the books and records of the
Company are kept." Second, as to each document of Greenshields,
the Bechard affidavits indicated the document (1) was made at or
near the time of the occurrence of the matters set forth therein, (2)
was made by a person with knowledge of the matters recorded or
from information transmitted by persons with such knowledge, (3)
was prepared and kept in the course of regularly conducted business
and (4) was a duplicate of an original document of Greenshields. ...
[T]he Bechard affidavits further state[d] that it was the "regular
practice" of Greenshields "to check the correctness of" and "to rely
on" records of the kind being certified . . ..
Bertoli, 854 F. Supp. at 1032 (citations omitted). The Bertoli court also found
that three Euro Bank documents were sufficiently authenticated:
The documents were certified by an affidavit submitted by Ivan
Burgess ("Burgess"), the records custodian of Euro Bank, which
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The first four facts to be certified track the foundation requirements
of the business records hearsay exception, codified in Federal Rule
of Evidence 803(6).12 a The legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 3505
clearly states that "[s]ubsection 3505(a)(1) 'should be interpreted in
the same manner as the comparable language in Rule 803(6) is
interpreted.""'1 24 Thus, a certificate will suffice under 18 U.S.C. §
3505 if it states all of the facts that would have made it sufficient
had the certifier testified at trial to lay the foundation under Rule
803(6).
affidavit complied with the requirements of section 3505(a)(1).
The [affidavit] stated that Burgess had knowledge of the manner in
which the books and records of Euro Bank were. kept as a result of
his "duties and responsibilities" at Euro Bank, and that the documents
in question (1) were made at or near the time of the occurrences set
forth therein, (2) were prepared by persons with knowledge of the
matters recorded or from information transmitted by persons with
such knowledge and (3) were kept in the regular course of business
and these types of records were made as a regular business practice.
Regarding reliability, the Euro Bank documents enjoyed a pre-
sumption of reliability given they were the documents of a Cayman
Islands bank. In addition, the [affidavit] stated that "it was the
regular practice of [Euro] Bank to check the correctness of" and to
"rely on" the types of documents certified. Finally, the reliability of
these documents was further supported by the fact that Rodney Bond,
during his deposition, recognized and identified these documents as
original Euro Bank documents.
Accordingly, Exhibits 2453(y) and 2453(aa) were admitted pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3505. As the Government argued, Bertoli's objection
regarding the lack of underlying documentation to explain the contents
of these exhibits was a comment on the weight to be given to the
documents, rather than an objection to their admissibility.
Id. at 1033-34 (citations omitted).
123. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though
the declarant is available as a witness:
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions,
opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from infor-
mation transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course
of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular
practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the
custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information
or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trust-
worthiness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes
business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling
of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
124. H.R. REP., supra note 114, at 3 (quoted in United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d
1507, 1515 (llth Cir. 1994)).
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The certifier need not have first-hand knowledge of the facts
recorded, of their recording, or of who reported them. 25 An affi-
davit or certificate has been held sufficient if it has tracked the
business records hearsay exception foundation, especially, but not
only, when the court explicitly recognizes the foreign country as
one having a record-keeping system similar to that of the United
States. 126
Indeed, the federal courts evaluating evidence offered under 18
U.S.C. § 3505 have required "'[o]nly substantial compliance ' ' '2 7
with the statute. If every particular of the statute has not been met,
the courts still have found the certified documents admissible, if
the courts are satisfied as to the fundamental issue that the offered
"'documents bear the indicia of reliability."" '2 8 The mere fact that
125. See supra note 103.
126. See supra note 123; see infra note 128.
127. Bertoli, 854 F. Supp. at 1033 (citing United States v. Sturman, 951 F.2d 1466,
1489 (6th Cir. 1991), that approved admission of documents by stating that
the "attestations satisfy most of the provisions of section 3505 [even though]
[t]he certificate fails to state that the 'record was made ... by (or from
information transmitted by) a person with knowledge of those matters.' 18
U.S.C. § 3505(a)(1)(A) .... This Court, when interpreting similar language in
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6), has held that a witness need only have
knowledge of the recordkeeping procedures. United States v. Hathaway, 798
F.2d 902 (6th Cir. 1986). In this case, a bank official, who would necessarily
have some knowledge of the bank's recordkeeping procedures, provided the
certification.") (footnote omitted).
As the Bertoli court explained:
For instance, in Gleave, the court found that (1) a custodian's signature
does not need to be legible or include a position and address, (2) a
custodian does not need to "aver making false statements that would
subject [him or her] to criminal sanctions" or say what penalties may
be imposed and (3) certifications do not need to specify if the custodian
"swore" or "affirmed" (swearing under oath) under penalty of per-
jury. 786 F. Supp. at 278-79; see also Sturman, 951 F.2d at 1489
(certification does not need to be physically attached to records or
identify specific records being authenticated); Chan, 680 F. Supp. at
523 ("copy" of a record is permissible).
854 F. Supp. at 1031-32 n.101. See United States v. Strickland, 935 F.2d 822,
831 (7th Cir. 1991) (certification "does not require the use of a 'magic form'
upon which the employee/record-provider of foreign company must certify that
he is aware that his answers come under penalty of perjury").
128. United States v. Bertoli, 854 F. Supp. 975, 1033-34 (D.N.J. 1994) (quoting
Strickland, 935 F.2d at 831). See also United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507,
1515-17 & nn.11, 17 (lth Cir. 1994) (no violation of Confrontation Clause to
have admitted foreign business records, including "Aruban immigration records
[computer printouts], Spanish and Italian hotel records, and Canadian passport
applications, currency exchange records, car registration records, and phone
tolls," against defendant pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3505); United States v.
Miller, 830 F.2d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1033 (1988)
(bank records from Cayman Islands were reliable); United States v. Gleave,
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the certifier is not in court to testify does not demonstrate unreli-
ability. 129
VI. ALASKA, KENTUCKY, AND TEXAS RULES
SUBSTANTIVELY IDENTICAL TO MARYLAND RULE
5-902(A)(I 1)
There is no case law construing the Kentucky Rule'30 that is
substantively identical to Maryland Rule 5-902(a)(l 1), and there is
little reported case law construing the substantively identical Alaska 3'
and Texas12 Rules. The one case on point, a Texas appellate case,' 33
construing a state rule substantively identical to Maryland Rule 5-
902(a)(l 1), however, supports the conclusion that a certification
under the Rule need only track the same business records foundation
requirements as if the certifier had testified at trial. That is, the
certifier need not have had any more first-hand knowledge than
786 F. Supp. 258, 279 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (because the Cayman Islands "is a
member of the United Kingdom with business practices like those in the United
States," its bank records had requisite indicia of reliability), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom., United States v. Knoll, 16 F.3d 1313
(2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Hing Shair Chan, 680 F. Supp. 521, 525
(E.D.N.Y. 1988) (Hong Kong is a British colony with business practices much
like those in the United States, and its hotel records are reliable); United States
v. Garland, 991 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1993) (no showing was made that records
of facts found by tribunal in Ghana were untrustworthy).
129. See United States v. Garland, 991 F.2d 328, 332-34 (6th Cir. 1993) (court of
appeals judicially noticed criminal judgment in Ghana, insofar as to show the
existence of detailed findings of fact by the court in Ghana, provable as foreign
document under 18 U.S.C. § 3491 or § 3505; the records satisfied the trust-
worthiness requirements of § 3505, as "[tihere is no indication that the records
presented in the instant case are unreliable or that the process by which the
record was made is untrustworthy."); Bradford Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch
Pierce, Fenner, and Smith, Inc., 805 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1986) (opponent of
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C) public records evidence must make "an
affirmative showing of untrustworthiness, beyond the obvious fact that the
declarant is not in court to testify") (quoting Kehm v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg.
Co., 724 F.2d 613, 618 (8th Cir. 1983)).
130. Ky. R. EVlD. 902(11).
131. ALASKA R. EVID. 902(11). In the one reported Alaska case citing Alaska Rule
of Evidence 902(11), the proponent of the evidence-certified copies of cali-
bration certificates that were offered to show that a radar unit was properly
calibrated-had offered it as certified copies of public records, under Rule
902(4), and the court merely noted that the certification did not attempt to
track the requirements of 902(11); nor, in the court's opinion, was it clear
"whether the preparation of calibration reports would qualify as regularly
conducted [business] activity." Buening v. State, 814 P.2d 1373, 1376 n.4
(Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
132. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 902(10); TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 902(10).
133. March v. Victoria Lloyds Ins. Co., 773 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
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would authenticating witnesses under the Maryland case law.,3 4
That Texas appellate case held that the affidavit accompanying
a laboratory analysis and an attached report of the medical examiner
regarding the alcohol concentration in the blood of the deceased
truck driver victim of a motor vehicle accident was sufficient to
comply with the Rule. 35 The court found the report to be sufficient
because it was "clear as to who drew the sample and when it was
drawn,"'13 6 even though the certifier clearly had no first-hand knowl-
edge of the acts recorded because the blood was drawn by another
person at another location. 13 7
In rejecting the claimants' argument that the affidavit by a
toxicologist, Prouty, was inadequate to make the record self-au-
thenticating, Justice Farris, writing for the intermediate Texas ap-
pellate court, made clear that an affidavit to facts that would have
been sufficient to lay the business records foundation if the affiant
had testified at the trial was sufficient under the Texas Rule:
Rule 902(10) provides that records that would be ad-
missible under 803(6) will be admissible upon the affidavit
of the person who would otherwise testify that the prere-
quisites were met, if the affidavit states that the record
was in fact kept as required by Rule 803(6). Rule 902(10)(b)
provides a sample affidavit 138 and states that affidavits that
follow and substantially comply with it will satisfy the
requirement of authentication. Toxicologist Prouty's affi-
davit tracks the sample affidavit provided in the rule almost
verbatim. Prouty did not state he was the custodian of
records; however, it is clear that he is a qualified witness
and competent to testify to the 803(6) prerequisites.
Although Prouty did not draw the blood sample and
therefore does not have personal knowledge of that act,
his report is made with information transmitted by the
medical examiner who did draw the blood sample. The
affidavit states that it was in the regular course of the
Office of the Chief Medical Examiner's business to have
an employee or representative with personal knowledge of
the acts recorded to transmit information concerning the
act for inclusion in the records.
As to the [claimants, the] Marches' complaint that the
affidavit is defective because it does not attest to the
134. See supra note 99.
135. TEX. R. Cirv. EvrD. 902(10).
136. March, 773 S.W.2d at 788.
137. Id. at 789.
138. See infra part XI, Appendix, and accompanying note 250.
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accuracy or trustworthiness of the report, we note that the
requirements for authentication under Rules 803(6) and
902(10) do not require the sponsoring witness or affiant to
testify as to the trustworthiness of the report. The witness
or affiant is to set forth the facts upon which an assessment
of trustworthiness can be made by the court. 3 9
Thus, the Texas court held that a statement was sufficient if it
certified that the regular course of business was to have the infor-
mation provided by or from someone in the business who had first-
hand knowledge . 40 It was not necessary that the affiant-certifier
have, or state that he or she had, personal knowledge that the
particular information was transmitted by or from someone in the
business who had first-hand knowledge.' 41
The court treated the required statements identically to those
that would be sufficient if the affiant were to testify in court. The
Texas court's approach is both proper and necessary to best further
the goal of the Texas Rule and of Maryland Rule 5-902(a)(11)-to
preclude the necessity for that testimony in every case where the
opposing party is not willing to stipulate to authenticity.
VII. CONSTITUTIONALITY
A party in a civil case who wished to argue that Maryland Rule
5-902(a)(11) is unconstitutional likely would aver that the Rule
violates the Due Process Clause; 142 a defendant in a criminal case
would argue that the Rule violates the accused's confrontation
right. 43 Under the reasoning of the federal cases'" upholding the
analogous federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3505, and under the general
principles established by pre-Title 5 Maryland case law, the Rule
contains adequate protections of these rights.
First, in order to ensure reliability of the .evidence, the Rule
contains an explicit safety valve identical to that under the firmly-
rooted business records exception itself. 45 That valve is that the
139. March, 773 S.W.2d at 789.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. U.S. CONST. amend. V; MD. CODE ANN., CONST. Decl. of Rts. art. 2 (1981).
143. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also
MD. CODE ANN., CONST. Decl. of Rts. art. 21 (1981).
144. See infra note 149.
145. MD. RULE 5-803(b)(6) (see supra note 90 for text of Rule). Federal Rule .of
Evidence 803(6) contains the same language. See supra note 123 for text of
Rule. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C), which creates a hearsay exception
for factual findings made by public agencies after conducting investigations
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court will not find the Rule's requirements satisfied if "the sources
of information or the method or circumstances of preparation
indicate lack of trustworthiness."'1 46 Second, in the interest of fair-
ness, the Rule not only requires that advance notice be given to the
adverse party when one intends to take advantage of the Rule, but
it also provides that the adverse party be given sufficient advance
opportunity to inspect the evidence so as to have a "fair opportunity
to challenge it.' ,,4
A. 18 U.S.C. § 3505
Despite the vigorous argument of at least one commentator, a
criminal defense practitioner, that 18 U.S.C. § 3505 violates the
Confrontation Clause because it permits the admission of business
pursuant to law, uses similar language. FED. R. EvrD. 803(8)(C) ("unless the
sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthi-
ness"); see, e.g., In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, 37 F.3d 804, 827-
28 (2d Cir. 1994) (district court did not abuse its discretion in not finding
detective's conclusion untrustworthy); Bradford Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch
Pierce, Fenner, and Smith, Inc., 805 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1986) (opponent of
Federal Rule 803(8)(C) public records evidence must make "an affirmative
showing of untrustworthiness, beyond the obvious fact that the declarant is
not in court to testify") (quoting Kehm v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 724
F.2d 613, 618 (8th Cir. 1983)).
146. MD. RULE 5-902(a)(11)(c).
147. Id.; cf. Del Vecchio v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 31 F.3d 1363, 1388 (7th
Cir. 1994) (Illinois statute, "which permits the admission of hearsay evidence
at a capital sentencing hearing . . . protects the defendant by providing that
he 'shall be given a fair opportunity to rebut any information received at the
hearing.' The Constitution, also, requires that the defendant be given the
opportunity to rebut evidence which makes its way into the sentencing hearing
because of the lax evidentiary standards. Del Vecchio was given this opportu-
nity. He had access to the contested hearsay reports [on which the testifying
experts relied]; he could have cross-examined [the testifying experts] Drs. Rogers
and Cavanaugh about the reports; he could have called his own experts.
Because he was given the opportunity to be heard, he cannot now succeed on
this constitutional claim.") (citations omitted).
The House Report on the analogous 18 U.S.C. § 3505 avers:
The bill permits the admission of foreign business records if the
custodian provides a certification setting forth certain information
about the records and their manner of being kept. The Committee
believes, in view of the inherent trustworthiness of such records and
the ability of the defendant to challenge their admission if the source
of information from which they were made or the method or circum-
stances of their preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness, that the
legislation adequately protects against the admission of unreliable
evidence while at the same time facilitating the admission of a type
of evidence that is being required in an ever increasing number of
federal prosecutions.
H.R. REP., supra note 114, at 5-6 (emphasis added).
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records without the appearance of a witness at trial to lay the
foundation for the hearsay exception, 48 the cases unanimously have
upheld the statute as constitutional. 49
148. Brenner, supra note 115; see also Ronan E. Degnan, Obtaining Witnesses and
Documents (Or Things), 108 F.R.D. 223, 231 (1986) (predicting that a Con-
frontation Clause attack on 18 U.S.C. § 3505 is "certain" to be made). Ms.
Brenner relies on cases including United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 81 (2d
Cir. 1977) ("To be considered for admission the [hearsay] statement [of a
declarant who does not testify at trial] must bear sufficient indicia of reliability
to assure an adequate basis for evaluating the truth of the declaration, for its
truth will not be tested by adversary cross-examination at trial."), and Philips
v. Neil, 452 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1971) (Tennessee state court's admission of
medical records from mental examinations of defendant prior to alleged crime,
as business records, violated accused's confrontation right when no showing
of necessity was made and an inadequate showing of reliability was made;
inter alia, bases for conclusions in records were unclear), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 884 (1972). These cases precede the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). See infra text accompanying notes
156-57.
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has pointed
out, Oates' authority has been limited.
[Appellant] cites United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 81 (2d Cir.
1977), for the proposition that a statement admissible under a rec-
ognized hearsay exception may still violate a defendant's sixth amend-
ment rights. Oates is no longer valid authority on this point. If Exhibit
13 was admitted under a "firmly rooted" exception to the hearsay
rule, like the business records or official records exceptions, no
violation of the confrontation clause occurred. Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56, 66 & n.8, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 2539 & n.8, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597
(1980); United States v. Ray, 930 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir. 1991).
United States v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 127 n.3 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 170 (1992). Ms. Brenner argues that the opportunity to cross-examine the
foundation witness is essential. See Brenner, supra note 115, at 356-71; cf.
United States v. Gifford, 684 F. Supp. 125 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (admission of
depositions videotaped in Belgium was proper, where defense counsel had
unlimited scope of cross-examination there), aff'd, 892 F.2d 255, 263 (3d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1006 (1990).
She recognizes that United States v. Leal, 509 F.2d 122 (9th Cir. 1975),
is contrary to her argument. See Brenner, supra note 115, at 364-65 n.150.
Leal upheld the admission, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44 as applied
through Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 27, of the affidavit of an assistant
hotel manager, to which were attached an original hotel registration card and
telephone booking orders, to prove that the defendant and his wife were in
Hong Kong and thus had the opportunity to commit a particular act there.
Id. at 126. But Ms. Brenner distinguishes Leal on the theory that the particular
records were "official, or at least quasi-official records," since they were
mandated by a Hong Kong ordinance. Brenner, supra note 115, at 364-65
n.150.
149. United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1515-16 (11th Cir. 1994) ("The central
issue is whether the use of an affidavit to authenticate foreign business records
offends the Confrontation Clause. Although this Court has not yet had occasion
to address this question, every federal court to consider the issue has held that
1994l
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Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit so ruled, in agreement with the other federal courts that
have considered the question. 50 In support of its decision that 18
U.S.C. § 3505 is constitutional, that federal court cited a decision
by the Maryland court of appeals that upheld the constitutionality
of an admission, pursuant to a Maryland statute, of an affidavit
to prove the status of a bank account, without the need to have a
bank employee testify at trial.'
The analysis of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
like that of the Maryland court of appeals,' 15 2 follows the approach
developed by the United States Supreme Court, in a line of cases
beginning with Mattox v. United States,'53 recognizing that the
confrontation right "is not absolute."'51 4 Under the later case of
Ohio v. Roberts' and its progeny, the confrontation right is not
violated if either (1) the out-of-court declarant is unavailable to
testify, and the hearsay statement bears sufficient "indicia of
reliability' ' 5 6 (these indicia may be present either (a) because the
statement "falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception"' 57 or (b)
section 3505 comports with the Confrontation Clause. See United States v.
Sturman, 951 F.2d 1466, 1490 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2964
(1992); United States v. Miller, 830 F.2d 1073, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 1033 (1988); United States v. Gleave, 786 F. Supp. 258, 276-
280 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) [aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom.,
United States v. Knoll, 16 F.3d 1313 (2d Cir. 1994)]; United States v. Hing
Shair Chan, 680 F. Supp. 521, 522 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). See also Chapman v.
State, 331 Md. 448, 452-67, 628 A.2d 676, 678-86 (1993) (holding that out-of-
court statements admitted under state statute permitting use of affidavit to
establish status of bank account without requiring bank employee to testify
bore sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to satisfy requirements of federal
Confrontation Clause, in part because federal courts have upheld the similar
section 3505). We agree with those authorities and conclude that section 3505
is neither per se unconstitutional nor unconstitutionally applied in this case.")
(emphasis added).
150. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507 (lth Cir. 1994).
151. Id. at 1516 (citing Chapman v. State, 331 Md. 448, 452-67, 628 A.2d 676,
678-86 (1993)); see infra text and accompanying notes 173-92.
152. Chapman, 331 Md. at 453-60, 628 A.2d at 679-82.
153. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
154. Ross, 33 F.3d at 1516; see, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990)
(accused's confrontation right "may be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face
confrontation at trial [but] only where denial of such confrontation is necessary
to further an important public policy and only where the reliability of the
testimony is otherwise assured"), on remand sub nom., Craig v. State, 322
Md. 418, 588 A.2d 328 (1991).
155. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
156. Id. at 65-66.
157. Id. at 66; accord Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 816 (1990); United States v.
Kelly, 892 F.2d 255, 260-63 (3d Cir. 1989) (admitting depositions of witnesses
taken in Belgium, with defense attorneys present and having opportunity to
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because it has been supported by "a showing of particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness"),"' or (2) even if the declarant is
available to testify, the declarant's in-court testimony likely would
be less probative than the out-of-court statement.5 9
cross-examine, and when defendants were permitted to listen to the depositions
live and to speak with their attorneys by telephone, did not violate defendant's
confrontation right; evidence fell within firmly-rooted hearsay exception for
prior testimony of unavailable declarants), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1006 (1990).
Business records fall within a firmly-rooted hearsay exception. See, e.g., United
States v. Franks, 939 F.2d 600, 603 (8th Cir. 1991); Chapman v. State, 331
Md. 448, 457 n.3, 628 A.2d 676, 680-81 n.3 (1993); see also United States v.
Hudson, 479 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1972) (conviction of failure to report for draft
upheld, based on anonymous statement in public officer's report), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1012 (1973); Hanley v. United States, 416 F.2d 1160, 1167-68 (5th
Cir. 1969) (admission of business records did not violate defendant's confron-
tation right), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 910 (1970).
158. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980); accord Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S.
805, 816 (1990); Chapman v. State, 331 Md. 448, 457, 628 A.2d 676, 681
(1993) ("[W]here hearsay statements are admitted under an exception which is
not considered 'firmly rooted,' then they are 'presumptively unreliable and
inadmissible for Confrontation Clause purposes' and must be excluded, at least
absent a 'showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."' Lee v.
Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543 (1986) (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66). These
guarantees of trustworthiness must be such that the evidence is 'at least as
reliable as evidence admitted under a firmly rooted hearsay exception' so as
to assure 'that adversarial testing would add little to its reliability.' Wright,
497 U.S. at 821 (citations omitted).").
159. White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 742-43 (1992) (Confrontation Clause does
not require prosecution to prove the unavailability of a declarant to testify
before it may prove hearsay falling within the firmly rooted "spontaneous
declaration" and "medical examination hearsay exception," FED. R. EVID.
803(2), (4); "[Those same factors that contribute to the statement's reliability
cannot be recaptured even by later in-court testimony."); Bourjaily v. United
States, 483 U.S. 171, 182-83 (1987) (no violation of Confrontation Clause in
admission of out-of-court statement of an unavailable co-conspirator, pursuant
to firmly rooted hearsay exception (now categorized as nonhearsay under
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E)); because exception is firmly rooted, "a
court need not independently inquire into the reliability of such statements"));
United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 395 (1986) (Confrontation Clause does
not require prosecution to show that co-conspirator is unavailable to testify
before it can introduce his or her statements made during and in furtherance
of the conspiracy; "[e]ven when the declarant takes the stand, his in-court
testimony seldom will reproduce a significant portion of the evidentiary value
of his statement during the course of the conspiracy"); see, e.g., Minner v.
Kerby, 30 F.3d 1311, 1315 (10th Cir. 1994) (New Mexico state court did not
violate defendant's confrontation right by admitting police chemist's laboratory
notes, showing that powder was cocaine of 43% purity, when chemist did not
testify at trial-although his supervisor, as well as another chemist who also
tested the powder, did testify-"the unavailability requirement [of Ohio v.
Roberts] does not apply in situations where cross examination of the declarant
would be of little value to the defense. Reardon [v. Manson], 806 F.2d [39]
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Both requirements of the first of these two situations are met
by 18 U.S.C. § 3505. Unavailability is established by the fact that
the federal courts' subpoena powers do not extend to foreign
countries. 60 A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit reasoned that, because 18 U.S.C. § 3505 is an
innovation, more liberal in its dispensation of the live foundation
witness than the modern business records hearsay exception codified
in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6), it is not a "firmly-rooted"
hearsay exception. 161 Thus, guarantees of trustworthiness must be
shown, "such that the evidence is equally reliable as evidence
admitted under a firmly rooted hearsay exception to ensure that
confrontation through cross-examination would add little to its
believability. ''162
The Eleventh Circuit panel agreed with the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that foreign business records
at 41 [(2d Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1020 (1987)] (quoting [Ohio v.]
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 n.7). This case fits into that category. See Manocchio
[v. Moran], 919 F.2d [7701 at 774 [(1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 910
(1991)] (dealing with admissibility of autopsy report). The APD chemists test
numerous suspected controlled substances. It is unlikely that a chemist would
remember any particular piece of evidence he tested. Id. at 775; Reardon, 806
F.2d at 41. If Green had testified, he likely would have relied on his notes
and on his knowledge of standard laboratory procedures in order to testify
about the condition of the evidence when he received it and the steps he took
in testing it. Furthermore, as the Second Circuit noted in Reardon, producing
a police chemist as a witness rarely leads to any admissions which are helpful
to the defense. Id. at 42. The admission of Green's laboratory notes into
evidence was proper under the Confrontation Clause."); Chapman v. State,
331 Md. 448, 467-72, 628 A.2d 676, 686-88 (1993) (no constitutional requirement
that bank employee who signed affidavit be shown to be unavailable to testify).
160. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(e)(2) (cited in United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507,
1515 (lth Cir. 1994)). Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), requires that the
government undertake reasonable, good faith efforts-not only formal, but
also informal-to obtain a witness' testimony. Id. at 724-25. The cases have
made clear that what is reasonable is in part a function of expense and in part
a function of how critical the out-of-court statement is and whether it is
disputed. See, e.g., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 212-16 (1972) (defense
failed to show any new inquiries it would have of witness who testified at
prior trial); United States v. Rivera, 859 F.2d 1204 (4th Cir. 1988) (United
States Attorney's actions were reasonable under circumstances), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1020 (1989).
161. United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1516-17 (11th Cir. 1994).
162. Id. at 1516 (citing Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. at 821 (citation omitted), and
United States v. Strickland, 935 F.2d 822, 831 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[Section] 3505
did not change the benchmark question in this and every situation involving
the admission of documentary evidence: do the documents bear the indicia of
reliability?"), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 917 (1991), and cert. denied, 502 U.S.
1036 (1992).).
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offered under 18 U.S.C. § 3505 bore such sufficient indicia of
reliability. 163 Both courts reasoned:
The novelty of the statute is to admit the records without
confrontation by the defendant with the recordkeepers.
No motive is suggested that would lead [the business]
officials to change, distort, or manipulate the records at
issue here. The recordkeepers have, under criminal pen-
alties in their own countries, asserted that the records are
records kept in the ordinary course of business. Exami-
nation of the recordkeepers by counsel for [the defendant]
could not reasonably be expected to establish anything
more or less than that. If the records were in fact inac-
curate, it was within [the defendant's] power to depose
the recordkeepers and challenge the records. 164
Thus, the burden is on the opponent to generate an issue of
untrustworthiness. 165
Absent a real question as to trustworthiness, it is difficult to
see how due process could be violated by admission of certified
business records or how a confrontation argument could be more
than a disingenuous exercise in creating a phantom for the prose-
cution to shadow-box. 66 As Chief Judge Weinstein of the United
163. Ross, 33 F.2d at 1517; United States v. Miller, 830 F.2d 1073, 1077-78 (9th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1033 (1988).
164. Ross, 33 F.3d at 1517 (quoting Miller, 830 F.2d at 1077-78).
165. See supra note 129.
166. See United States v. Albert, 773 F.2d 386, 388-89 (1st Cir. 1985) (no error in
admitting, to prove that robbed bank was federally insured, a certified copy
of the bank's FDIC issued certificate of insurance; not only did the prosecution
lay a proper foundation through a live witness, but "there was no question
that the certificate was trustworthy or that the institution was, as stated in the
certificate, federally insured. Indeed, Albert offered no evidence contradicting
the prosecutor's evidence of the bank's insured status. United States v. Baldwin,
644 F.2d 381, 385 (5th Cir. 1981). Therefore, the district court did not abuse
its discretion admitting the insurance certificate as a business record under Fed.
R. Evid. 803(6). See United States v. Wingard, 522 F.2d 796, 797 (4th Cir.
[1975]) [per curiam], cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1058 (1976) [FDIC certificate, self-
authenticating public document under seal, was proved properly to have been
hanging in bank]."); United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1032 (2d Cir.
1985) ("l1t is highly unlikely that . . . the authenticating witnesses' presence
at the trial . . . would have weakened the reliability of the records."); United
States v. Hadley, 671 F.2d 1112, 1116 (8th Cir. 1982) (in holding that district
court had not erred in admitting, to prove essential fact that bank was federally
insured, a certificate of insurance and a canceled check representing payment
of insurance, both identified by the bank president, the court of appeals
commented: "There was no real question that the documents were genuine or
that the institution was federally insured."). But see United States v. Pelullo,
964 F.2d 193, 201, 203 (3d Cir. 1992) (reversible error to admit bank records
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States District Court for the Eastern District of New York wrote
in admitting Hong Kong hotel records authenticated by foreign
certification under 18 U.S.C. § 3505:
One could conceive of a scenario in which defendant was
not at the Hotel Regal Meridien despite all this documen-
tation. Perhaps Shum was trying to frame Chan and had
someone impersonate the defendant. Defendant's counsel
did not so argue to the jury. A jury, steeped in the bizarre
world of television and politics, might have accepted such
a far-fetched explanation and given little or no weight to
the documents. But such remote possibilities do not form
the basis for an exclusionary rule. We follow the more
common sense approach of allowing the jury to decide
probative force so long as there is a reasonable ground
for the jury's evaluation of generally trustworthy hear-
say. 167
As Judge Weinstein explained, common sense dictates the admission
of apparently trustworthy foreign business records that have been
certified as authentic. Opponents, of course, may attack their
weight. 168
B. Maryland Law
The innovations in Maryland Rule 5-902(a)(11), derived from
18 U.S.C. § 3505, are that the Rule is extended to civil cases and
for which a Federal Rule of Evidence .803(6) foundation was not laid, even
though defendant "has not stated any reason why the records are not reliable";
"an accused is under no duty to rebut bare allegations by the prosecutor that
documents are what they purport to be and establish the truth of what they
represent").
Similar judgments as to fairness and efficiency have been made by the
Maryland General Assembly in passing statutes under which evidence of drivers'
blood alcohol test results, the chain of custody of controlled dangerous subst-
ances and the chain of custody of dead bodies will be admissible without
supporting live testimony, unless the defendant takes specified steps to require
the witness' presence. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 10-306, 10-
1003, 10-1004(c) (1989); see MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 27, § 901.2; see
also Chapman v. State, 331 Md. 448, 460-67, 628 A.2d 676, 681-86 (1993)
(instructive as to how to evaluate the reliability of hearsay); Bailey v. State,
327 Md. 689, 612 A.2d 288 (1992) (instructive as to how to evaluate the
reliability of hearsay); 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 353; KENNETH C. DAVIS
& RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 9.11, 10.4 (3d
ed. 1994) (in administrative proceedings, the agency or administrative law
judge, in evaluating hearsay evidence, should consider the relative importance
of the subject matter versus the cost of acquiring better evidence).
167. United States v. Hing Shair Chan, 680 F. Supp. 521, 525 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
168. See supra note 122.
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to domestic business records. Although the custodian of business
records is less likely to be unavailable to testify, the records are
not less likely to be reliable.
The Maryland court of appeals decisions, like those of the
United States Supreme Court, recognize that the confrontation
right is not absolute-else it would preclude all hearsay, including
hearsay falling within firmly rooted exceptions, such as the business
records exception.1 69 Before the adoption of Maryland Rule 5-
902(a)(11), the foundation for the business records exception could
be laid either with a witness-who need not have any knowledge
as to the substance recorded, but only as to the recordkeeping
procedure'70-or, in some cases, without a witness. '7 In the latter
cases,. Rule 5-902(a)(11) has not taken away any opportunity to
cross-examine; in the former and more usual situation, the Rule
had often not provided a means to take away a meaningful op-
portunity to cross-examine' 72 on the substantive point.
169. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 205 Md. 528, 109 A.2d 732 (1954) (application of
business records hearsay exception, codified in MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD.
PROC. § 10-101 (1989), against an accused criminal does not violate defendant's
confrontation right guaranteed by Article 21 of Maryland Declaration of
Rights); see also State v. Garlick, 313 Md. 209, 213-19, 545 A.2d 27, 29-32
(1988) (admissibility of business and hospital records generally); Bowers v.
State, 298 Md. 115, 136-37, 468 A.2d 101, 112 (1983) (admission of autopsy
report without medical examiner's testimony did not violate accused's confron-
tation right), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 890 (1986); Reynolds v. State, 98 Md.
App. 348, 357, 633 A.2d 455, 459 (1993) ("We are persuaded that cross-
examination of these persons [who merely wrote down patient's statements in
hospital records] would have been pointless.").
170. See supra note 95; cf. MD. RULE 5-803(b)(18) (under which an expert must
testify in order for a learned treatise to be admitted). The expert could be
cross-examined on the substantive points.
171. See supra notes 93-94.
172. See, e.g., Chapman v. State, 331 Md. 448, 628 A.2d 676 (1993). The Chapman
court quoted the opinion in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 n.7 (1980): 'A
demonstration of unavailability, however, is not always required. In Dutton v.
Evans, 400 U.S. 74 ... (1970), for example, the Court found the utility of
trial confrontation so remote that it did not require the prosecution to produce
a seemingly available witness .... .' Chapman, 331 Md. at 456, 628 A.2d at
680. The court further stated that "[in such instances [regarding admissibility
of business or public records], the routine nature of the task, while bolstering
reliability of the document, also decreases the probability that the declarant
will remember the events memorialized in the entry. See State v. Sosa, 59
Wash. App. 678, 800 P.2d 839, 843 (1990) (lab experts who prepare reports
are unlikely to recall details of routine report completed weeks before trial).
This fact satisfies the necessity prong, since the cross-examination of the
declarant would likely be futile and the most accurate evidence of the event is
the affidavit itself." Chapman, 331 Md. at 471, 628 A.2d at 688; see also
Reynolds v. State, 98 Md. App. 348, 633 A.2d 455 (1993); State v. Spikes,
423 N.E.2d 1122, 1127 (Ohio 1981) ("Testimony by the preparers of the
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In its 1993 decision in Chapman v. State,'73 the Court of
Appeals of Maryland upheld, against a Confrontation Clause chal-
lenge, a somewhat analogous statute regarding proof of bank
records.74 Part of the consolidated theft statute enacted in Mary-
land in 1978 provides that the dishonor of a check, including the
status of a bank account, for example, the account's nonexistence
or the insufficiency of funds in it, may be proved by affidavit of
an authorized bank representative.' 75 When such evidence 76 was
hospital records would have added little or nothing. The possibility that their
testimony would demonstrate that the records 'might have been unreliable was
wholly unreal."' (citation omitted)). See also infra notes 186-89 and accom-
panying text.
173. 331 Md. 448, 628 A.2d 676 (1993).
174. Id. at 450, 628 A.2d at 677.
175. As explained by Judge Chasanow, author of the unanimous opinion of the
court of appeals:
In 1978, as part of a large-scale revision of Maryland's theft and
bad check laws, the General Assembly enacted S.B. 1153, Chapter
849 of the 1978 Acts of Maryland. One section of that comprehensive
statutory scheme is now Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl. Vol.),
Article 27, § 142(c). Section 142(c) provides a narrow exception to
the hearsay rule, permitting the State to introduce an affidavit of a
bank to establish dishonor of a check or the status of an account
without requiring any of the bank's employees to testify. Article 27,
§ 142(c) provides:
§ 142. [Obtaining property or services by bad check]-Presumptions.
(c) Dishonor of a check by the drawee, that the drawer had no
account with the drawee at the time of utterance, and insuffi-
ciency of the drawer's funds at the time of presentation and
utterance may properly be proved by introduction in evidence
of a notice of protest of the check, or a certificate under oath
of an authorized representative of the drawee declaring the
dishonor, lack of account and insufficiency, and this proof shall
constitute presumptive evidence of the dishonor, lack of account
and insufficiency.
Id. at 450, 628 A.2d at 677 (footnote omitted).
176. The affidavit in question provided:
To: State's Attorney for Harford County
AFFIDAVIT AS TO ACCOUNT STATUS
RE: Account #001150107 Drawer John V. Chapman
Check #148
Amount $315.49 Payee Sears
Check Dated 4/19/88 Drawee (Bank) Fairfax Savings
Date Uttered: 4/19/88
1, Michael L. Stockman, of Fairfax Savings ... at 17 Light St.,
Baltimore, Maryland do hereby make oath to the following facts:
1. That the above named drawer /DID NOT have the above
numbered account with this bank on April 19, 1988.
3. That the above referenced check was presented for payment on
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admitted against a defendant accused of obtaining property or
services by a bad check, defense counsel argued that the accused's
confrontation rights were violated.'"7 But, in upholding the defen-
dant's conviction, the court of appeals unanimously upheld the
statute's constitutionality, both on its face and as applied. 17
Judge Chasanow, writing for the court, evaluated the Maryland
statute under Ohio v. Roberts7 9 and its progeny. 80 He concluded
that, although an affidavit of the type permitted by the statute did
not fall within a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception, it nonetheless
"generally possesses sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness so as
to satisfy the reliability prong of Ohio v. Roberts,"'' such that
'there is no material departure from the reason of the general
rule"' requiring cross-examination.8 2 As to trustworthiness, the
court recognized that the statute "is a direct derivative of the
business records exception,"'8 3 making but two liberalizing changes
to that exception:
First, the General Assembly decided to allow the State to
forego the admission of the voluminous actual bank re-
cords and instead substitute a summary of the relevant
information that those records would invariably reveal.
Second, the General Assembly also decided to forego the
need for testimony of the bank employee who prepared
April 21, 1989.
4. That at the time of the presentation of the above referenced
check there were INSUFFICIENT funds in the account and the said
check was dishonored.
5. That I am an authorized representative of the above named
financial institution.
Michael L. Stockman
(Signature)
Id. at 452, 628 A.2d at 678.
177. Id. at 450, 628 A.2d at 677.
178. As Judge Chasanow stated:
Today, we are called upon to address whether this relatively recent
exception to the hearsay rule violates an accused's confrontation rights
embodied in both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. We hold
that the admission of documentary evidence under Article 27, § 142(c),
is neither per se unconstitutional nor unconstitutional under the facts
of this case. We believe the evidence admissible under § 142(c) contains
sufficient indicia of reliability so as not to offend a criminal defen-
dant's right of confrontation.
Id.
179. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
180. Chapman, 331 Md. at 454, 628 A.2d at 679.
181. Id. at 456, 628 A.2d at 680.
182. Id. at 458, 628 A.2d at 681 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980)).
183. Id. at 459, 628 A.2d at 682.
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the account summary of the account in question. We
believe that the General Assembly made a valid judgment
in thus expanding the manner in which the State may
prove an account's status, or its non-existence. These
procedural "short-cuts" are well grounded and do not
undermine the reliability and trustworthiness of data con-
tained in account records created and maintained in the
ordinary course of the bank's business. Rather, the Gen-
eral Assembly, in enacting § 142(c), invoked well-accepted
evidentiary practices to prove the status of an account by
means of an account summary or the lack of an account
through the absence of entries in business records. 8 4
The court further found that there was no constitutional re-
quirement that the declarant bank representative be shown to be
unavailable,'85 as the reliability of the documentary evidence was
not less, 8 6 and might even be greater, 87 than the representative's
live testimony at trial. As Judge Chasanow explained:
Section 142(c) deviates from the [traditional] practice
of using summaries of records in one way: the need to
present a bank employee, as custodian of the records or
as the one who prepared the summary, to lay the appro-
priate foundation. This deviation from the admission of
the bank's business records or summaries of those records,
however, is not fatal to § 142(c). The General Assembly
may properly excuse the testimony of an out-of-court
declarant or custodian of records where it does not un-
dermine the reliability of the proposed evidence, as it has
184. Id. at 460-61, 628 A.2d at 682-83.
185. Id. at 470-73, 628 A.2d at 687-89 ("With Inadi and White, it appears that the
Supreme Court has emphasized that Roberts contemplated a rule of necessity,
not one of unavailability. Accord Moon v. State, 300 Md. 354, 366, 478 A.2d
695, 701 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1207 (1985) (exceptions to rule requiring
cross-examination permitted in past "'after close scrutiny has disclosed that
this type of evidence is both necessary and so intrinsically reliable that it need
not be subjected to the rigors of cross-examination') (emphasis in original)").
186. As to reliability, Judge Chasanow concluded:
Considering § 142(c)'s adoption of familiar evidentiary principles, its
close similarity to business and public records exceptions and the
indicia of reliability associated with those exceptions, the lack of any
apparent motive to fabricate, and the corroborative quality of the
canceled check, we conclude that Article 27, § 142(c) is generally so
reliable that "adversarial testing would add little to its reliability."
Id. at 467, 628 A.2d at 686 (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 821
(1990)).
187. See infra text accompanying note 189.
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for example in the case of public records under Md. Code
(1974, 1989 Repl. Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings
Art., § 10-204.188
He drew an analogy between bank records and public or official
records:
Similar policies that underlie the official records ex-
ception to the hearsay rule also support § 142(c). First, in
light of the great reliability accorded the banking records
and the absence of any motive on the part of the bank
employees to fabricate, the General Assembly could legit-
imately assume that the bank would accurately complete
its task of examining and summarizing its records. Addi-
tionally, the very purpose of § 142(c) was to avoid the
unnecessary burdening and disruption of the banking sys-
tem by requiring the bank to present ministerial witnesses
to carry to court a bank's business records. Furthermore,
these decisions are buttressed by the limited utility that
cross-examination of a record's custodian would provide
the criminal defendant in a bad check prosecution. Bank
employees generate and utilize the bank's records with
great frequency. With the routine of repetitive examination
of the bank's records comes the probability that the details
concerning any given transaction will fade. The affidavit
recording the summary of the account, that the bank
employees contemporaneously generate, might even con-
stitute better evidence than the subsequent live testimony
of the witness who examined the records. The live custo-
dian could say little more than the affidavit- "I searched
the record and this is what I found." Cross-examination
is, thus, unlikely to clarify the record or jog the declarant's
memory beyond the recorded information in the affidavit.
Due to the limited utility to criminal defendants of
cross-examining bank employees and the substantial bur-
den to banks associated with it, we find that the Con-
frontation Clause does not require the State to establish
the unavailability of the bank employee who compiled the
Affidavit as to Account Status. Accordingly, we hold that
Article 27, § 142(c) does not violate the mandates of the
Confrontation Clause by omitting such an unavailability
requirement.18 9
188. Chapman, 331 Md. at 462-63, 628 A.2d at 683.
189. Id. at 472-73, 628 A.2d at 688-89.
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In reaching its conclusion that the Maryland statute met the
requirements of Ohio v. Roberts,190 the court of appeals cited with
approval federal cases that have upheld the constitutionality of 18
U.S.C. § 3505.191 Both these cases and Chapman 92 support the
conclusion that Rule 5-902(a)(11) will withstand a Confrontation
Clause challenge.
In any event, the touchstone of admissibility remains reliabil-
ity.193 The opposing party is free to argue that the records authen-
ticated under Rule 5-902(a)(11) and offered under Rule 5-803(b)(6)
are untrustworthy and should be excluded-an argument that should
be made pretrial, if feasible. The trial court may use the manage-
ment of litigation rules, 194 in conjunction with Maryland Rule 5-
902(a)(12),195 to require pretrial objections. Even if the court rules
the certified records admissible, the objecting party is free to
subpoena a witness or witnesses from the business and to examine
such witnesses in an attempt to diminish the weight to be given
the records by the finder of fact.
Provisions for pretrial notice prevent surprise to the opponent.
If the opponent makes no attack on the record's trustworthiness,
that party should be held to have waived any objection on the
foundation issue. If the custodian or other witness is equally
available to both parties and the opponent does not call the witness,
the opponent should not be permitted to attack the evidence on
the basis that the witness in question did not testify, and counsel
was not able to question the witness. 96
190. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
191. Chapman, 331 Md. at 460, 628 A.2d at 682.
192. It should be noted, however, that the Chapman court's analysis emphasized
the special reliability of "the banking industry" as a "quasi-public agency."
Id. at 464, 628 A.2d at 684. Nonetheless, the court's general rationale should
extend to all regularly kept business records.
193. See supra note 128.
194. Maryland Rule 2-504.2(b)(8) provides in part:
The following matters may be considered at a pretrial conference:
(8) A listing of the documents and records to be offered in evidence
by each party at the trial, other than those expected to be used solely
for impeachment, indicating which documents the parties agree may
be offered in evidence without the usual authentication; ....
MD. RULE 2-504.2(b).
195. Maryland Rule 5-902(a)(12) provides that the following is self-authenticating:
"Unless justice otherwise requires, any item as to which, by statute, rule, or
court order, a written objection as to authenticity is required to be made before
trial, and an objection was not made in conformance with the statute, rule,
or order." MD. RULE 5-902(a)(12).
196. This conclusion is an application of the well-established principle that a negative
inference against a party for the failure to produce particular evidence is
available only if that party has superior access to the evidence. See MARYLAND
EVIDENCE, supra note 27, § 301.4, at n.9.
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VIII. OPINIONS CONTAINED WITHIN BUSINESS
RECORDS: THE SAME QUESTIONS REMAIN AS
EXISTED BEFORE TITLE 5 WAS ADOPTED
Maryland Rule 5-902(a)(11) provides only a means for authen-
ticating an exhibit as a business record, without the need for a
custodian or other witness to testify to the keeping of the records
to lay the foundation under Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(6). Any busi-
ness records, including those of hospitals or of doctors' offices,
will qualify under the liberal definition of "business" in Rule 5-
803(b)(6).1 97 In order for a record to be admissible, however, it
also must meet the requirements of relevance, 198 and, if the contents
of the record are very important to a critical issue in the case, the
copy or original must be offered in accordance with the "best
evidence rule."' 99
Moreover, the fact that a record qualifies as a trustworthy
business record does not necessarily mean that all of its contents
will be admissible under the hearsay exception for business records.
Either the hearsay rule or the opinion rules may exclude parts of
it. If the record contains statements of someone who is not a part
of the business 200 or statements not made in the regular course of
business,20' those statements must be qualified either as nonhearsay
or under other exceptions to the hearsay rule. 20 2 Even if the hearsay
rule does not exclude the evidence, the opinion rules may. 203 Mar-
yland Rule 5-902(a)(1 1) has not changed the law on any of these
other points.
The pertinent case law states the general rule that opinions
stated in business records, when apparently stated by someone who
is a part of the business and made in the course of that business,
will be admissible if that person would be qualified to state that
197. See MD. RULE 5-803(b)(6); supra note 90.
198. See MD. RULES 5-401 to 5-403 (defining and explaining "relevant evidence").
199. See MD. RULES 5-1001 to 5-1008 (defining and explaining "best evidence rule");
see also Goodman v. State, 2 Md. App. 473, 477, 235 A.2d 560, 562 (1967)
(error to admit opinion testimony based on business records, when business
records had not been admitted into evidence).
200. See supra note 115.
201. See supra note 10.
202. See MD. RULE 5-805 (explaining hearsay within hearsay); Charles J. Murray,
Admissibility of Hospital Records-A Continuing Problem, 29 TEX. B.J. 163,
214 (1966); Robert E. Powell, Admissibility of Hospital Records into Evidence,
21 MD. L. REV. 22, 35-37, 45-58 (1961).
203. See MD. RULES 5-701 to 5-705 (explaining opinion testimony); see generally 2
MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 287, at 268, § 293, at 280-81; Powell, supra note
202, at 37-45, 57-58.
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opinion on the stand if he or she testified at the trial.2 °4 But both
204. Smith v. Jones, 236 Md. 305, 310, 203 A.2d 865, 868 (1964) ("A written
opinion of a doctor, if properly authenticated, may be admissible as part of a
hospital record.") (dictum) (holding opinion stated by foreman of District of
Columbia Street Sign Shop, in response to an inquiry, was admitted improp-
erly); Dunn v. State, 226 Md. 463, 478, 174 A.2d 185, 192 (1961) (hospital
records); Fuget v. State, 70 Md. App. 643, 653-54, 522 A.2d 1371, 1375-76
(1987) (hospital records); In re Colin R., 63 Md. App. 684, 692-93, 493 A.2d
1083, 1087 (1985) (hospital records); Raithel v. State, 40 Md. App. 107, 118-
20, 388 A.2d 161, 167-68 (1978) (psychiatrists' opinions contained in Clifton
T. Perkins State Hospital report were admissible), aff'd on other grounds, 285
Md. 478, 404 A.2d 264 (1979); Marlow v. Cerino, 19 Md. App. 619, 636, 313
A.2d 505, 515 ("Where . . . it appears from the hospital record that the
opinion [contained in it] is expressed by a qualified person, such an expression
is admissible."), cert. denied, 271 Md. 739, 331 A.2d 115 (1974); Sarrio v.
Reliable Contracting Co., 14 Md. App. 99, 103-04, 286 A.2d 183, 185-86
(1972) (hospital records containing intern's notations that plaintiff was drunk
properly admitted); accord, e.g., Baker v. State, 473 So. 2d 1127, 1129 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1984) ("To the extent that [an autopsy] report contains opinions,
those opinions are admissible on the theory that if the physician who performed
the autopsy was a witness, his testimony would be admissible as that of an
expert."), cert. quashed by 473 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1985); River Dock & Pile,
Inc. v. 0 & G Indus., 595 A.2d 839, 846 (Conn. 1991) ("An opinion included
within an otherwise admissible business record is admissible if the entrant
would be qualified to give that opinion in oral testimony."); City of Bay St.
Louis v. Johnston, 222 So. 2d 841, 847 (Miss. 1969) ("The hearsay objection
being obviated by the Uniform Business Records Act, a proper expert medical
opinion contained in a hospital record is accorded dignity equal to that of a
similar opinion from the witness stand.") (citing Allen v. St. Louis Pub. Serv.
Co., 285 S.W.2d 663 (Mo. 1956)); State v. Taylor, 486 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Mo.
1972) ("The contention that [police criminalist] Cordell Brown was not available
for cross-examination is answered by Allen v. St. Louis Public Service Co....
where it was ruled: 'Objections to such [business] records as hearsay and as
depriving a party of the right of cross-examination are, therefore, not effective
if the records have been properly qualified under the Uniform Business Records
Act .... Since the hearsay objection is obviated, we see no reason why a
proper expert medical opinion contained in a hospital record should not be
accorded dignity equal to that of a similar opinion from the witness stand; to
preserve the right of cross-examination intact as to such matters would be to
repeal the statute."'); Graham v. State, 547 S.W'2d 531, 538 (Tenn. 1977)
(reversible error to exclude hospital records because they did not establish
doctor's qualification as a psychiatrist; "The qualifications of the individual
preparing the report may be inquired into, may be challenged or may be
disputed, but this goes to weight and not admissibility."); see also Dassing v.
Fred Frederick Motors, Inc., 240 Md. 621, 625, 214 A.2d 925, 927 (1965)
(figure on application for transfer of title of automobile was not sufficient
evidence of automobile's value, where there was no testimony as to who
expressed that opinion); West v. Fidelity-Baltimore Nat'l Bank, 219 Md. 258,
264-65, 147 A.2d 859, 862-63 (1959) (statute relating to admissibility of business
records "did not modify or alter the rule which forbids an expression of
opinion by a person who is not competent to express an opinion." Entries
made by nurses as to testator's mental condition, rather than physical condition,
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the case law205 and the Maryland Rules 2 6 require that, before
admitting opinion evidence, the court must find that there is a
sufficient basis for the opinion and that the subject matter is an
appropriate subject for opinion testimony.
Thus, even though, by virtue of Rule 5-902(a)(11), the custo-
dian or other qualified witness is not needed to authenticate the
record as a business record, a live witness still will be needed if
either:
(1) the business record does not establish all the facts needed
to be proved, such as that the proved medical bills were "reasonable
and customary;" 20
7
(2) the business record contains opinions but does not disclose
a sufficient basis for those opinions; 0
were excluded properly); State v. Rhone, 555 S.W.2d 839, 841-42 (Mo. 1977)
(en banc) (no abuse of discretion in admitting results of tests performed by
person shown by custodian's testimony to have been police criminologist for
approximately one year). But see, e.g., Neas v. Snapp, 426 S.W.2d 498, 500-
01 (Tenn. 1968) (error to admit an unauthenticated autopsy report containing
a doctor's opinion as to cause of death; foundation as business records was
not laid, the qualifications of the doctor to give an opinion were not shown,
and the defendant was deprived of the right of cross-examination). See generally
2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, §§ 287, 307; 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra
note 87, § 1533 (opinion rule should not exclude statements in business records
of unavailable declarants); 6 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1707 (1976) (hospital
records).
Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(6), like Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6), explicitly
embraces business records of "opinions" or "diagnoses." The federal Advisory
Committee's Note explains that this language was added "[in order to make
clear [the rule's] adherence to" those pre-federal rules decisions which "expe-
rienced no difficulty in freely admitting diagnostic entries," with respect to
"medical diagnoses, prognoses, and test results." FED. R. EVID. 803 (Advisory
Committee's Note).
Such statements of opinion will be admissible as long as the business
record contains circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, for example, if it
appears that they were made by a person qualified to express such an opinion.
See, e.g., Thomas v. Hogan, 308 F.2d 355, 360-61 (4th Cir. 1962) (federal
shop book statute created presumption of accuracy of hospital records, includ-
ing routine opinions contained in them; error to have excluded results of blood
test for alcohol).
205. E.g., Reynolds v. State, 98 Md. App. 348, 357-58, 633 A.2d 455, 459 (1993);
Hytha v. Schwendeman, 320 N.E.2d 312, 317-18 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974).
206. MD. RULES 5-701, 5-702(3).
207. Grimm, supra note 42, at 5; see In re Gloria T., 73 Md. App. 28, 33-34, 532
A.2d 1095, 1097-98 (1987) (medical bills would not be admissible to support
restitution award without evidence of their reasonableness; a representative of
the hospital should have been called to testify to that), cert. denied, 311 Md.
718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988). But see OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.421 (Baldwin
1993) (providing that medical or funeral bills are prima facie evidence of their
reasonableness, if a copy is delivered to opposing counsel at least five days
before trial).
208. E.g., Hartless v. State, 327 Md. 558, 578-79, 611 A.2d 581, 590-91 (1992); see
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(3) even if a sufficient basis for the opinion appears, it is not
an appropriate subject of opinion evidence; 20 9
(4) the out-of-court declarant is not qualified to opine on the
subject; 21 0 or
(5) even if a sufficient basis for relevant opinions appears in
the record, due process or the confrontation clause requires that
the person whose opinion is offered must testify at the trial. 2'1
also Reynolds v. State, 98 Md. App. 348, 356-61, 633 A.2d 455, 459-61 (1993)
(defendant's confrontation right was violated by admission of victim's hospital
records, containing opinions of health care providers about sexual abuse, when
defendant could not cross-examine those providers, and opinions appeared to
lack adequate factual basis, as they appeared to be based only on an ascer-
tainment of credibility of persons involved); Grimm, supra note 42, at 5
(medical records would not establish "that the treatment itself was appropri-
ate"); People v. Young, 234 Cal. Rptr. 819, 831-32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (no
error in excluding psychiatric records of defendant, offered by state, when,
although doctors testified, state had not examined them "as to the source and
preparation of the psychiatric records").
209. See, e.g., Bohnert v. State, 312 Md. 266, 276-79, 539 A.2d 657, 662-63 (1988);
see also MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 27, §§ 701.1-.7, 702.1.
210. See supra note 204; see generally MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 27, §§
701.1, 702.1.
211. Ward v. State, 76 Md. App. 654, 659-62, 547 A.2d 1111, 1113-15 (1988)
(admission of forensic psychiatrist's testimony that state hospital staff's diag-
nosis of defendant was unanimous violated his confrontation right and was
reversible error); Cirincione v. State, 75 Md. App. 166, 183-84, 540 A.2d 1151,
1159-60 (proper to refuse to permit testifying defense doctor to make reference
to statements in a report of Clifton T. Perkins Hospital that three other doctors
had concluded that defendant was voluntarily intoxicated on PCP), cert. denied,
313 Md. 611, 547 A.2d 188 (1988); Leuschner v. State, 41 Md. App. 423, 435-
36, 397 A.2d 622, 629-30 (no error in permitting psychiatrist, who had examined
accused upon court's referral for a psychiatric evaluation following his filing
a plea of insanity, to refer to hospital record, and to read part of a filled-out
form, that showed results of a staff conference, when the psychiatrist read
only the diagnosis and not an opinion as to accused's legal sanity), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 933 (1979); Gregory v. State, 40 Md. App. 297, 325-28, 391 A.2d
437, 454-56 (1978) (although hospital record fell within business records excep-
tion, admission of that part of it containing three doctors' opinions as to
accused's sanity violated his right to confrontation); see also Birdsell v. United
States, 346 F.2d 775, 779 (5th Cir.) (under 28 U.S.C. § 1732, the statutory
predecessor to Federal Rule 803(6), opinions as to sanity, contained in hospital
records, are inadmissible if expert-declarant is unavailable for cross-examina-
tion; but same result does not apply as to all "the records of a hospital
performing psychiatric investigations with respect to the symptoms recounted
by the subject or the results of recognized psychological tests"), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 963 (1965); Hopkins v. State, 19 Md. App. 414, 425, 311 A.2d 483,
489 (1973) (under facts of case, harmless error, if error at all, to admit copy
of autopsy report, over defendant's objection that pathologist who prepared
the report was not present to be cross-examined). But see Sangster v. State,
70 Md. App. 456, 466-69, 521 A.2d 811, 815-17 (1987) (report from Clifton
T. Perkins Hospital was admitted properly in competency hearing; Gregory
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The first fotir of these principles are relatively straight-forward.
The fifth, the most elusive, is addressed below.
A. Opinions That Are Generally Held Admissible Without the
Declarant's Testimony
Examination of the cases from Maryland and other jurisdic-
tions reveals a panoply of positions 12 on the issue of when the
person who expressed the opinion must testify at trial in order for
the opinion to be admissible as substantive evidence." 3 The question
is made all the more difficult because there is no bright line between
"fact" and "opinion"; rather, they are linked by a continuum of
gray. 21 4 Several threads emerge from the case law, however.
was inapposite, because no confrontation right attached in competency hearing,
but, even if it had, defendant waived right to cross-examine doctors by not
calling them as witnesses), aff'd, 312 Md. 560, 541 A.2d 637 (1988) (no
violation of statute or of defendant's due process right).
212. See 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 92, J 803(6)[07] ("The [federal] circuits
have split on whether records admissible pursuant to the business records
exception consistently satisfy confrontation clause requirements."); see also id.
1 803-235 n.31.
213. A hearsay basis, though substantively inadmissible, often may be proven to
explain the basis for an admissible opinion. See MD. RULE 5-703; see, e.g.,
Smith v. State, 285 N.E.2d 275 (Ind. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 129 (1973),
Beahm v. Shortall, 279 Md. 321, 327, 368 A.2d 1005, 1009 (1977); Primavera
v. Celotex Corp., 608 A.2d 515, 518-19 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), appeal denied,
622 A.2d 1374 (Pa. 1993); MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, §§
2.703.1, 2.703.4.b.
214. E.g., River Dock & Pile, Inc. v. 0 & G Indus., Inc., 595 A.2d 839, 846
(Conn. 1991) ("The type of analysis contained in exhibit 00 lies somewhere on
the continuum between fact and opinion."); Commonwealth v. Chong Xiong,
630 A.2d 446, 452 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) ("Drawing the line between what is
fact and what is opinion is often difficult and has led to varying results."),
appeal denied, 641 A.2d 309 (Pa. 1994).
This point has been more fully examined in the context of Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(8)(C), under which "factual findings" in certain public records
may be admissible. Compare Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153,
162 (1988) (interpreting the term "factual findings" broadly, as including
"factually based conclusions or opinions") and Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingere,
Inc., 303 Md. 581, 613-14, 495 A.2d 348, 364-66 (1985) (Eldridge, J., concur-
ring) (interpreting the term broadly) with id. at 612, 495 A.2d at 364 (giving
the term "factual findings" a narrow reading). Drawing the line between fact
and opinion in Coast Guard reports under Federal Rule 803(8)(C) has also
proven difficult. Compare Strehle v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 136, 138
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("Factual findings of the United States Coast Guard investi-
gation are also deemed admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) .... By contrast,
Coast Guard investigators' opinions and conclusions are not considered in
order to prevent fear of financial liability to lead investigators . .. to downplay
errors committed which require correction.") (citations omitted) with In re
Nautilus Motor Tanker Co., 862 F. Supp. 1251, 1254 (D.N.J. 1994) (holding
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The jurisdictions generally seem to agree that "opinions" are
admissible as part of business records, without the need for live
testimony by the person who stated the opinion, if they are "in-
cident to or part of factual reports of contemporaneous events or
transactions. ' 215 Such opinions include medical conditions observed
by an admitting physician, 2 6 the recording by hospital personnel
that "Coast Guard report, inclusive of its opinions and conclusions, is admis-
sible pursuant to Rule 803(8)(C)," and commenting that the "District Courts
in the Third and Second Circuits have interpreted the Beech Aircraft decision
broadly in admitting Coast Guard investigatory reports into evidence.").
Before the Maryland Court of Appeals embraced the public records hearsay
exception in Ellsworth, it analyzed such reports under the business records
statute. See Pine St. Trading Corp. v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 278 Md. 363, 372-
74, 364 A.2d 1103, 1110-11 (1976) (reports of the Food and Drug Administra-
tion, including an analysis of food samples that allegedly contained adulterated
sugar, were encompassed within the Business Records Act).
215. Forward Communications Corp. v. United States, 608 F.2d 485, 511 (Ct. Ci.
1979) (per curiam); see Hanley v. United States, 416 F.2d 1160, 1166-68 (5th
Cir. 1969) (bank vice-president's notations on checks, identifying them as
belonging to defendant, were admissible under business records exception);
People v. Moore, 85 Cal. Rptr. 194, 199 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (commitment
to mental institution); Ross v. State, 78 Md. App. 275, 283-86, 552 A.2d 1345,
1349-51 (no violation of confrontation right in admission of telephone com-
pany's business records against defendant), cert. denied, 316 Md. 365, 558
A:2d 1207 (1989).
216. See Bethlehem-Sparrows Point Shipyard v. Scherpenisse, 187 Md. 375, 380-81,
50 A.2d 256, 259-60 (1946) (no error in admission into evidence of that part
of claimant's hospital record that gave the history of the case, particularly the
statement, "[platient cut left foot and developed an infection involving entire
leg"); Ledford v. State, 568 S.W.2d 113, 118 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978) (error
to exclude hospital records offered by defendant, which included statements
by physician and nurse that the defendant had been "badly beaten" with metal
tipped belt, had "voided [urine] involuntarily," and had been "apparently
beaten"); Loper v. Andrews, 404 S.W.2d 300, 305 (Tex. 1966) (hospital record
of a "severed limb or an open wound" would have been admissible).
As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
explained in New York Life v. Taylor:
Records must be those which are a product of routine procedure and
whose accuracy is substantially guaranteed by the fact that the record
is an automatic reflection of an observation. Regularly recorded facts
as to the patient's condition or treatment on which the observations
of competent physicians would not differ are of the same character
as records of sales or payrolls. Thus, a routine examination of a
patient on admission to a hospital stating that he had no external
injuries is admissible. An observation that there was a deviation of
the nasal septum is admissible. Likewise, an observation that the
patient was well under the influence of alcohol ....
In other words, it is not the absence of a motive to misrepresent
which is the basis of the Shop Book exception to the hearsay rule.
Purely clerical entries come within the rule regardless of the fact that
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of statements by the patient, 2 7 and laboratory test results. 28 These
the party making them has an interest in what they may be used to
prove. Conversely where the accuracy of the entries depends on
opinion, conjecture or judgment in selecting the particular entries
from a larger mass of data which some other observer might consider
equally relevant, the entries are not within the Rule regardless of
motive.
The reasons for the Shop Book Rule are well stated by Wigmore
to be (1) that the influence of habit may be relied on, by very inertia
to prevent casual inaccuracies; (2) that errors or misstatements in a
regular course of business transactions are easily detected and mis-
statements cannot safely be made if at all except by a systematic and
comprehensive plan of falsification; (3) that since the entrant is under
a duty to an employer or other superior there is a risk of censure or
disgrace from the superior in case of inaccuracy. The records of
opinion and hearsay accounts of conversations involved in this case
fail to satisfy any one of these tests.
The Court's rule as to admissibility is clearly based upon the subject
matter of the entries, their routine character, and their similarity to
payrolls and the like. The opinion is not intended to 'open the door
to avoidance of cross-examination' on the mass of opinion, conjecture
and observation now regularly reported in the course of modern
business . . ..
... [Tihe test should be whether they are records of a readily
observable condition of the patient or of his treatment. . . . Some
diagnoses are a matter of observation, others are a matter of judgment,
still others a matter of pure conjecture ...
New York Life v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297, 303-04, 306 (D.C. Cir. 1944) (footnotes
omitted).
217. Reynolds v. State, 98 Md. App. 348, 356-61, 633 A.2d 455, 459-61 (1993)
(defendant's confrontation right did not extend to hospital personnel who
merely recorded what patient-victim had said; patient's statement was admissible
under another hearsay exception).
218. Minner v. Kerby, 30 F.3d 1311, 1314-15 (10th Cir. 1994) (no violation of
Confrontation Clause in admission of police chemist's notes showing results
of testing of powder for drugs); State v. Garlick, 313 Md. 209, 215-26, 545
A.2d 27, 30-35 (1988) (hospital records made in regular course of business and
pathologically germane to treatment are admissible under business records
hearsay exception; foundation was laid by emergency room physician for
records containing laboratory test results; no need to produce lab technician
or show technician's unavailability) (distinguishing Moon v. State, 300 Md.
354, 478 A.2d 695 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1207 (1985), where record
bore serious facial indicia of unreliability)); Peace v. Director of Revenue, 765
S.W.2d 382, 383 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (error not to admit breathalyzer report
as business record); State v. Martorelli, 346 A.2d 618, 622 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1975) (blood test report admissible); State v. McGeary, 322 A.2d
830, 834-35 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974) (inspection certificate of breath-
alyzer falls under both business records and public records hearsay exception,
but proponent failed to authenticate it and failed to lay foundation as to
business records); Cynthia H. v. James H., 458 N.Y.S.2d 490, 492 (N.Y. Fain.
Ct. 1983) (CPLR § 4518(c) regarding reports of blood genetic markers tests
"exists, of course, for the specific purpose of relieving the proponent of any
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opinions are seen as closer to the fact side of the fact-opinion
continuum, thus there is a greater chance of their having been
accurately reported.
B. Approaches with Regard to Other Kinds of Opinions
Where the courts differ widely is as to the admissibility of
"opinions" closer to the opinion side of the fact-opinion contin-
uum. Three recurring positions may be summarized as follows:
(1) The most liberal position: Expert opinions are ad-
missible as part of business records if a sufficient showing
of expert qualifications is made;2 19
of the enumerated records from the burden of producing a witness to lay a
business record foundation. However, it is well established that it also permits
the scientific opinions and conclusions of physicians which are contained in
hospital records to come into evidence without any requirement that those
physicians be called to give expert testimony.") (citations omitted); People v.
Mack, 382 N.Y.S.2d 424, 426 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (admitting laboratory
reports offered by defendant); March v. Victoria Lloyds Ins. Co., 773 S.W.2d
785, 789 (Tex. App. 1989) (toxicologist's report showing percentage of alcohol
in blood sample from deceased was admissible without accompanying expert
testimony). But see United States v. Allen, 7 M.J. 345 (C.M.A. 1979) (error
to admit laboratory reports as business records, but harmless error because
they also were used as basis for testifying doctor's opinion). See generally 4
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 92, 803(6)[061.
219. See, e.g., Bruneau v. Borden, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 894, 896 (D. Conn. 1986)
("While the rationale may vary, courts have focused on the ultimate untrus-
tworthiness of opinion beyond diagnosis in medical reports when they are not
subjected to the test of cross-examination. As explained in Skogen v. Dow
Chemical Co., 375 F.2d 692, 704-05 (8th Cir. 1967): 'Hospital records are
generally admissible as business records to show the case history and the
injuries suffered, even though the information is technically hearsay. Though
such records may of necessity contain some basic conclusions, there is a point
at which opinion evidence and expert opinions as to how an accident occurred
will be objectionable .... If plaintiffs desired the jury to have the benefit of
this expert conclusion, they should have called the person who made it, properly
qualify him as an expert, and have him so testify in front of the jury. ...
We do not believe plaintiffs should be allowed to present to the jury this
otherwise inadmissible conclusion as to the cause of plaintiffs' condition simply
because it fortuitously appears in a hospital record, and thereby deny to
defendants the protection afforded by an oath and the opportunity to cross-
examine the witness. This type of conclusion on the highly controversial ultimate
issue of the cause of plaintiffs' condition does not qualify as an entry made
"in the regular course of . . . business" . . . ."'); see also Hopkins v. State,
19 Md. App. 414, 311 A.2d 483 (1973) (harmless error to admit copy of
autopsy report over defendant's objection that pathologist who prepared the
report was not present to be cross-examined); Goodman v. State, 2 Md. App.
473, 235 A.2d 560 (1967) (reversible error to admit, at a trial for forging a
physician's prescription, opinion testimony of a telephone company employee
regarding business records for the telephone number listed on the prescription
when records were not admitted into evidence and witness had not been
qualified to give an opinion); supra note 204.
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(2) The most restrictive position: "[R]eports which are
prepared to state or to support expert opinions are not
admissible without the preparer being present in court to
testify as to his qualifications as an expert and to be cross-
examined on the substance, pursuant to Rules 702 and
705; ' ' 220 and
(3) The moderate position: If the would-be cross-exam-
iner can show the need to cross-examine, then the expert
opinions should not be admitted as parts of business
220. Forward Communications Corp. v. United States, 608 F.2d 485, 510-11 (Ct.
Cl. 1979) (per curiam) ("[U]nless [Federal] Rule [of Evidence] 803(6) is deemed
to override the opinion rules, it should not be construed to allow the intro-
duction of expert opinions without opportunity to ascertain the qualifications
of the maker, the extent of his study or for other reasons to cross-examine
him."); see Oldham v. State, 422 S.E.2d 38, 40 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) ("Business
records containing only test results must be distinguished from those records
that contain conclusions and opinions in addition to the test results or in lieu
of the test results. Such opinions, conclusions and diagnoses constitute addi-
tional hearsay and unless the person who [sic] diagnosis, conclusion or opinion
which is contained on the business record is available to testify and can be
qualified as an expert capable of rendering such an opinion, the portion of
the business record containing the hearsay is inadmissible.") (citations omitted);
B & 0 R.R. v. Zapf, 192 Md. 403, 411-12, 64 A.2d 139, 142-43 (1949) (report
of findings of radiologist from X-ray taken of a claimant for worker's com-
pensation did not qualify as business record and was admitted erroneously in
evidence during the testimony of the physician who had referred the claimant
for the X-ray; "When such a technical medical report is offered, the doctor
should be subject to cross-examination as to the reasons for his findings.");
Hopkins v. State, 19 Md. App. 414, 311 A.2d 483 (1973) (harmless error to
admit copy of autopsy report over defendant's objection that pathologist who
prepared the report was not present to be cross-examined); Commonwealth v.
Chong Xiong, 630 A.2d 446, 451 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) ("[U]nder the Uniform
Business Records as Evidence Act . . . 'hospital records have been admitted to
show the fact of hospitalization, treatment prescribed and symptoms found.'
Opinion evidence contained in hospital records, however, is not admissible.
'The rationale for excluding medical opinion in hospital records lies in the fact
that such evidence is expert testimony and is "not admissible unless the doctor
who prepared the report is available for in-court cross-examination regarding
the accuracy, reliability and veracity of his opinion .... ) (citations omitted);
see also Masterson v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 182 F.2d 793, 796-97 (3d Cir.
1950) (business records exception does not embrace doctors' opinions, made
to a third party, regarding a patient's condition; physician should have been
called at trial); People v. Young, 234 Cal. Rptr. 819, 831-32 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987) (questioning whether psychiatric records qualify as business records at
all); Robert A. Lanier, Medical Records as Evidence: Can a Paper Witness
Have Opinions?, 24 TENN. B.J. 32, 37 (No. 2, Mar.-Apr. 1988) ("There is,
of course, no theoretical difference between the disadvantage to a party against
whom factual records, as opposed to opinion records, are offered. In both
instances, the opposing party is denied cross-examination. But it would seem
that there is a difference in the circumstantial reliability of factual, as opposed
to post facto, conclusory observations.").
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records without the live testimony of an available expert. 22 1
221. See United States v. Licavoli, 604 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1979) (no error to admit
business record containing opinion of appraiser, when opponent failed to alert
trial court to specific facts raising any doubt as to appraiser's qualifications),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 (1980). The Licavoli court stated: "We see no reason
to adopt an inflexible rule that every case requires the proponent of a business
record containing expert opinion to affirmatively establish the qualifications of
the person forming the opinion. Rule 803(6) expressly provides for the exclusion
of a business record if the source of information indicates a lack of trustwor-
thiness. That provision allows the trial judge, in the exercise of his or her
discretion, to exclude from evidence a record of the opinion of an expert whose
qualifications are seriously challenged." Id. at 622-23 (cited with approval in
2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 288, at 268 n.15: "The approach in Licavoli
is . . .consistent with the structure of the Federal Rule, which explicitly admits
opinions, and accordingly should allow their admission if they are made and
recorded in the regular course of a business unless the opponent raises a
challenge to their trustworthiness."); Bruneau v. Borden, Inc., 644 F. Supp.
894, 896-97 (D. Conn. 1986) (defense had raised sufficient questions about
trustworthiness of opinion to exclude it in report form; "While the rationale
may vary, courts have focused on the ultimate untrustworthiness of opinion
beyond diagnosis in medical reports when they are not subjected to the test of
cross-examination. As explained in Skogen v. Dow Chemical Co., 375 F.2d
692, 704-05 (8th Cir. 1967): 'Hospital records are generally admissible as
business records to show the case history and the injuries suffered, even though
the information is technically hearsay. Though such records may of necessity
contain some basic conclusions, there is a point at which opinion evidence and
expert opinions as to how an accident occurred will be objectionable .... If
plaintiffs desired the jury to have the benefit of this expert conclusion, they
should have called the person who made it, properly qualify him as an expert,
and have him so testify in front of the jury. . . . We do not believe plaintiffs
should be allowed to present to the jury this otherwise inadmissible conclusion
as to the cause of plaintiffs' condition simply because it fortuitously appears
in a hospital record, and thereby deny to defendants the protection afforded
by an oath and the opportunity to cross-examine the witness. This type of
conclusion on the highly controversial ultimate issue of the cause of plaintiffs'
condition does not qualify as an entry made "in the regular course of ...
business" and is consequently inadmissible."'); see Clowes v. Terminix Int'l,
Inc., 538 A.2d 794, 806 (N.J. 1988) (citing with approval Gunter v. Fischer
Scientific Am., 475 A.2d 671, 674 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1984) (in court's
discretion "expert opinion contained in business records may be excluded if it
relates to diagnoses of complex medical conditions difficult to determine or
substantiate")); State v. Martorelli, 346 A.2d 618 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div.
1975) ("It should be noted that not all diagnostic findings are admissible. The
degree of complexity of such procedures is the crucial issue"), cert. denied,
354 A.2d 642 (N.J. 1976); State v. Matulewicz, 499 A.2d 1363, 1366 n.l (N.J.
1985) ("A similar limitation with respect to Evidence Rule 63(13) was expressed
in Gunter v. Fischer Scientific American, 475 A.2d 671 (N.J. Super Ct. App.
Div. 1984), where it was recognized that 'expert opinion contained in a business
record may be excluded if it relates to diagnoses of complex medical condi-
tions. . . .' Conversely, routine observations, findings and complaints included
in such a record were termed clearly admissible. See also Lazorick v. Brown,
480 A.2d 223 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1984) (which cited approvingly the
19941 Self-Authentication of Business Records
1. Proposal for Civil Cases
The third or moderate position best advances both concerns
for fairness and judicial economy, at least in civil cases. It is thus
most consonant with the intention behind Rule 5-902(a)(1l)-to
advance judicial economy as much as possible, if this can be
achieved at no real cost to fairness.
This Article proposes that, in civil cases, opinions in business
records should be admissible in the court's exercise of its discretion
regarding the record's trustworthiness, 222 as long as three criteria
have been established: (1) the helpfulness tests of Rules 5-701223 or
5-702224 have been met, including the fact that the opinions are not
so ambiguous as to be unhelpful; 225 (2) the opinions are of the type
regularly made in the course of the particular business activity; 2 6
and (3) no serious challenges have been raised either to a purported
expert's qualifications2 27 or to the adequacy of the basis of the
opinion. 221 On this last point, the complexity of the opinion,
view that a doctor's opinion, expressed in a business record otherwise admissible
under Evidence Rule 63(13), may be excluded as substantive proof if the
opinion relates to a diagnosis of a complex medical condition which is difficult
to determine or substantiate)."); Hunt v. Mayfield, 583 N.E.2d 1349, 1352
(Ohio App. 1989) (error to exclude hospital records); Murray, supra note 202,
at 211.
222. See, e.g., United States v. Zapata, 871 F.2d 616, 625-26 (7th Cir. 1989) (no
abuse of discretion, under circumstances of case, in admitting hotel guest
registration records); Le Claire v. Hovey, 237 N.W.2d 895, 898-99 (S.D. 1976)
(no abuse of discretion in admitting letter, offered by defendant, from doctor
consulted by plaintiff).
223. See MD. RULE 5-701; MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, §§ 2.701.1,
2.701.4.
224. MD. RULE 5-702; see MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, §§ 2.702.1-
.4; see also Dubs v. State, 2 Md. App. 524, 533-37, 235 A.2d 764, 769-72
(1967) (trial court correctly excluded certificates signed by physicians, stating
that defendant was "insane," when no proffer was made of testimony that
term was used not in broader medical sense but in narrower legal sense of
McNaughten-Spencer rule).
225. Reynolds v. State, 98 Md. App. 348, 357-60, 633 A.2d 455, 459-61 (1993) (and
cases cited therein); see also supra note 224.
226. This requirement, in line with one of the requirements for the business records
hearsay exception, enhances the opinions' reliability. See generally 2 Mc-
CORMICK, supra note 5, §§ 286-88.
227. See generally MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 27, § 702.2.
228. See Beatty v. Trailmaster Prods., Inc., 330 Md. 726, 741, 625 A.2d 1005, 1013
(1993) ("The premises of fact must disclose that the expert is sufficiently
familiar with the subject matter under investigation to elevate his opinion above
the realm of conjecture and speculation, for no matter how highly qualified
the expert may be in his field, his opinion has no probative force unless a
sufficient factual basis to support a rational conclusion is shown. The opinion
of an expert, therefore, must be based on facts, proved or assumed, sufficient
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including whether other experts reasonably might disagree,22 9 also
should be considered.
If the opponent can demonstrate no need to cross-examine,
then it is frivolous to require the proponent to call the expert at
trial.230 If this position is adopted, in many cases the proponent of
the record then would be free to make a tactical and economic
decision as to whether to call a live witness to present and explain
the record."' If the proponent of the record chooses to offer it
without calling the expert or other opinion witness, the opponent
still could call the expert or other opinion witness to the stand.
If the need to cross-examine has become clear through discov-
ery, the would-be cross-examiner should subpoena the expert2 3 2 or
to form a basis for an opinion, and cannot be invoked to supply the substantial
facts necessary to support such conclusion. The facts upon which an expert
bases his opinion must permit reasonably accurate conclusions as distinguished
from mere conjecture or guess.") (citations omitted).
229. See, e.g., State v. Martorelli, 346 A.2d 618 '(N.J. Super. 1975) (discussing
differences between simple tests and complex diagnoses), cert. denied, 354 A.2d
642 (N.J. 1976); Loper v. Andrews, 404 S.W.2d 300, 305 (Tex. 1966) (a
noncontroversial diagnosis of leukemia would have been admissible, but a
speculative conclusion as to cause of injuries being a skull fracture was admitted
improperly); 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 92, 803(6)[06], at 803-23
("If the expert is available and the diagnostic opinion is of a kind competent
physicians may disagree upon, the judge has discretion to require the expert
to testify to ensure trustworthiness through cross-examination, particularly if
the medical issue is critical, and the patient's liberty is at stake.") (footnote
omitted); see also 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 293, at 281 & nn.21-22 ("In
the absence of the availability of the expert for explanation and cross-exami-
nation, the court may conclude that probative value of this evidence is out-
weighed by the danger that the jury will be misled or confused. Exclusion here
would be under Federal Rule 403 or its state law counterpart. See Nauni v.
State, 670 P.2d 126, 131 [(Oki. Crim. App. 1983)] (diagnoses of mental or
psychiatric conditions are too complex and speculative to be admitted without
cross-examination). See generally [2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5,] § 185. This is
of particular concern if the opinion involves difficult matters of interpretation
and a central dispute in the case, such as causation. Under these circumstances,
a court operating under the Federal Rules, like earlier courts, is likely to be
reluctant to permit a decision to be made upon the basis of an un-cross-
examined opinion and may require that the witness be produced. Skogen v.
Dow Chemical Co., 375 F.2d 692 [(8th Cir. 1967)] (not error to exclude entry
that plaintiff's condition was caused by inhalation of insecticide).")
This factor is similar to McCormick's and Davis's point that in evaluating
the probative value of hearsay, an administrative law judge should consider
the degree of efficacy that cross-examination would have: Is credibility at issue?
Or would the opportunity to rebut by other evidence suffice? See DAVIS &
PIERCE, supra note 166, §§ 9.11, 10.4; 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 353.
230. Note also the possibility, in civil cases, of the taking and offering in evidence
of videotaped depositions of experts. See MD. RULE 2-419(a)(4).
231. Offering an opinion without supporting live expert testimony, even if permitted,
may not be the best tactical decision.
232. See MD. RULE 5-607 (parties may impeach their own witnesses); Marlow v.
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be held to have waived the right to complain about the lack of
opportunity to cross-examine the expert. If the expert or other
opinion witness is equally available to both parties and the oppo-
nent does not call the witness, the opponent should not be permitted
to attack the evidence on the basis that the witness in question did
not testify, and counsel was not able to question the witness. 233 If
the business records are offered pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-
902(a)(1 1), that Rule's provision for notice prevents surprise; failure
to subpoena the declarant under similar circumstances has been
viewed as a waiver of one's confrontation right. 23 4
Cerino, 19 Md. App. 619, 636-37, 313 A.2d 505, 515 (1974) (where it appears
from a hospital record that an opinion is expressed by a qualified person, such
an expression is admissible in evidence and it is incumbent upon the person
seeking to attack those opinions to call the declarant as a witness and examine
him or her for weakness or error); Gunter v. Fischer Scientific Am., 475 A.2d
671, 674 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984) ("If respondent wanted to call Dr.
Glass to explain any statements in the records, respondent would have had an
opportunity to do so."); State v. Martorelli, 346 A.2d 618, 622 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1975) ("It should be noted, of course, that the evidential
controversy herein involves only the admissibility of the [blood alcohol] test.
The weight which is to be accorded to the test is still subject to attack by one
who questions either the qualifications of or the results reached by the person
who performs the same. Such an attack may include the presentation of
retained experts or the production by defendant of the very personnel who
administered the laboratory test and noted the result in the admitted record.
The business records exception permitting the admissibility of the test result
merely relieves the offering party from producing the witness who participated
in the routine activity involved."); cf. Chapman v. State, 331 Md. 448, 473,
628 A.2d 676, 688 (1993) ("[I]f Chapman believed there was anything in the
bank records that would have aided his defense, he was free to subpoena those
records.").
233. See supra note 196.
234. See State v. Spikes, 423 N.E.2d 1122, 1126-30 (Ohio 1981) (no violation of
confrontation right in admission of hospital record-authenticated by written,
sworn certification-concerning victim's injuries, when, having received notice
of state's intent to offer the record and a copy of the record, pursuant to
Ohio statute, accused had opportunity to depose doctors or subpoena them
for trial, but did neither); see also supra text accompanying note 151; cf.
United States v. Tedder, 801 F.2d 1437, 1448-49 (4th Cir. 1986) (defense waived
evidentiary objections under 18 U.S.C. § 3505(b) by failing to file motion in
opposition before trial), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 938 (1987); United States v.
Johnpoll, 739 F.2d 702, 710 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1075 (1984)
(deposition testimony of five Swiss witnesses obtained pursuant to treaty
properly admitted over Sixth Amendment objections; witnesses were unavailable
at trial and defendants had waived objections by not attending taking of
depositions at government's expense as offered); Chapman v. State, 331 Md.
448, 473, 628 A.2d 676, 688 (1993) ("[Ilf Chapman believed there was anything
in the bank records that would have aided his defense, he was free to subpoena
those records."); State v. Miller, 326 N.E.2d 259 (Ohio 1975) (error to admit
probation officer's report on accused's attendance record, when, inter alia,
accused was not on notice that the evidence would be offered and thus could
not have compelled the officer's attendance to trial).
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2. Proposal for Criminal Cases
Absent such notice to and waiver by the accused in a criminal
case, however, the Confrontation Clause would seem to demand
that the declarant of an opinion as to nonroutine, highly significant
matters testify at trial35 unless the declarant is unavailable to
testify. 23 6 If the prosecution demonstrates that the declarant is
unavailable, then the court should examine the out-of-court state-
ment for circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, and admit
it only if these are found, in accordance with Ohio v. Roberts237
and its progeny. 211
IX. PROOF OF ABSENCE OF A BUSINESS RECORD OR
OF ABSENCE OF AN ENTRY IN A BUSINESS RECORD
Maryland Rule 5-902(a)(11) does not appear to permit authen-
tication by certification of the absence of a business record or the
absence of an entry in a business record. This conclusion follows
from a comparison of Maryland Rules 5-803(b)(7) and (10).
Rule 5-803(b)(10) provides that the hearsay rule need not
exclude evidence of the absence of a public record or of an entry
in a public record, which likely would have existed had a particular
fact been true. Rule 5-803(b)(7) provides similarly as to the absence
of a business record or of an entry in one. But Rule 5-803(b)(10)
explicitly provides that such proof regarding public records may be
made either "in the form of testimony or certification in accordance
with Rule 5-902."239
In contrast, Rule 5-803(b)(7), which concerns such proof re-
garding business records, uses only the nonspecific term, "evi-
dence." Since that Rule does not refer explicitly to proof by
certification and neither does Rule 5-902(a)(11) refer to proof of
absence of business records or the absence of entries in them, 240
235. See supra notes 211, 218, 220-21.
236. See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 554 S.W.2d 117 (Tenn. 1977) (harmless error,
under circumstances, to admit laboratory reports when State made no effort
to secure presence at trial of persons who conducted laboratory tests); State v.
Fears, 659 S.W.2d 370, 377-78 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983) (admission of labo-
ratory tests without live testimony held a violation of defendant's constitutional
confrontation rights); see also Munro v. Privratsky, 209 N.W.2d 745, 751-52
(N.D. 1973) (no abuse of discretion in excluding letter from deceased doctor).
237. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
238. See supra notes 155-59, 173-89.
239. MD. RULE 5-803(b)(10).
240. This point was raised in passing at the October 4, 1993 hearing held by the
court of appeals on Title 5. Judge Chasanow commented that counsel would
need a witness under Rule 5-803(b)(7), but because of Rule 5-902(a)(1 1), counsel
would not need a witness under Rule 5-803(b)(6). Cf. Ky. R. EvID. 902(11)
(referring to records of regularly conducted activity within the scope of Ken-
tucky Rule of Evidence 803(6) or 803(7)).
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application of the canon of statutory construction-that enacted
law in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed, 241
or that changes from the common law ought not be implied-
would lead to the conclusion that "evidence" under Rule 5-803(b)(7)
should take the form of testimony at trial, as it did under the few
pre-Title 5 Maryland cases on point. 242 If the records are volumi-
nous, proof by summary, under Maryland Rule 5-1006, would be
appropriate .243
It is this writer's recollection that the Evidence Subcommittee
was of the opinion that under Rule 5-803(b)(7) a witness should
testify at trial because of the importance of questions as to the
reliability and completeness of the record-keeping system and as to
the diligence of the search undertaken for the record or entry. 244
241. See, e.g., 2 SINGER, supra note 89, § 61.01. The provisions for proof by
certificate, under Rules 5-803(b)(10) and 5-902(a)(11), are changes from the
Maryland common law. See Hammond v. Norris, 2 H. & J. 130, 132 (1807)
(proof of absence of public record required live testimony).
242. See Summons v. State, 156 Md. 382, 386-87, 144 A. 497, 500 (1929) (cited
with approval in Chapman v. State, 331 Md. 448, 461-62, 628 A.2d 676, 682-
83 (1993)); Street v. State, 60 Md. App. 573, 577-79, 483 A.2d 1316, 1318
(1984), aff'd, 307 Md. 262, 513 A.2d 870 (1986); Todd v. Weikle, 36 Md.
App. 663, 676, 376 A.2d 104, 111-12 (1977) (testimony by investigator of
National Transportation Board that the pilot of a small plane did not file an
instrument flight plan was admitted properly).
On the other hand, the California proof of business records statute, for
example, is explicit as to proof of absence of records or of an entry in them:
"If the business has none of the records described, or only part thereof, the
custodian or other qualified witness shall so state in the affidavit, and deliver
the affidavit and such records as are available in the manner provided in
Section 1560." CAL. EviD. CODE § 1561(b) (West Supp. 1994). But the
California Court of Appeals for the First District has held that admission of
such evidence against a criminal defendant would violate the Confrontation
Clause. People v. Dickinson, 130 Cal. Rptr. 561 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
243. See State v. Chapman, 331 Md. 448, 460-62, 628 A.2d 676, 683 (1993);
MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, §§ 2.1006.1-4.
244. See Dickinson, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 562-64 (error to admit, in proceeding for
perjury by defendant in a prior trial in which he had testified as an expert
witness, affidavits to prove that he had not been employed or educated as he
had testified: "[Aidmitted into evidence was an affidavit by the custodian of
records for Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, stating that defendant had not
been employed by or associated with Lockheed in any capacity. An affidavit
by the custodian of business records of U.C.L.A. School of Engineering and
another by Dean O'Neill of the School of Engineering were admitted, disclosing
that defendant had never been employed by the School of Engineering of
U.C.L.A. A like affidavit was introduced to disclose that defendant had not
been employed as a director for the C stage of Saturn Five. . . . Assuming
[a]rguendo that [CAL. EviD. CODE 1561] would permit evidence, over objec-
tion, of the absence of an entry in a record by affidavit in a civil action, it is
clear that in criminal proceedings such evidence would violate the defendant's
right to confront witnesses against him guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
19941
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On the other hand, judicial economy would seem to warrant proof
by certificate, at least where the evidence in question was not
disputed. 24 15 The issue is one of policy for the Court of Appeals of
Maryland.
X. CONCLUSION
Maryland Rule 5-902(a)(11) creates an alternative means for
authentication of business records. Under the Rule, originals or
copies of business records will be self-authenticating if they are
certified as fulfilling the foundation requirements for the hearsay
exception set forth in Rule 5-803(b)(6), by a person who would
have been qualified to testify at trial to those foundation require-
ments. No further evidence will be needed in order to comply with
Rule 5-803(b)(6). Rule 5-902(a)(11)'s requirements for advance no-
tice to and opportunity to inspect by the adverse party, coupled
with its safety valve for the nonself-authentication of records when
the source of the information or other circumstances are shown to
betray a lack of trustworthiness, satisfy the fairness concerns of
the Due Process Clause and the Confrontation Clause of the United
States Constitution.
Rule 5-902(a)(11) is consistent with the pre-Maryland Rules of
Evidence cases that sometimes permitted the introduction of busi-
of the federal Constitution and by Article I, section 15, of the California
Constitution. The right of cross-examination is an essential safeguard of a fair
trial and a major reason for the confrontation rule is to give the defendant
the opportunity to cross-examine. When the only evidence of the absence of
an entry in a record is by affidavit, the defendant has no opportunity to pose
the multitude of questions which might occur concerning, for example, the
extent and adequacy of the search for the entry. There are other permissible
means of introducing evidence of the ab~sence of an entry. The records them-
selves may be admissible depending upon the trustworthiness of the circum-
stances surrounding the making of the record. Moreover, we do not mean to
suggest that the foundational facts attesting to the circumstances under which
the records were prepared may not be introduced in a criminal case by affidavit.
If the business records are so voluminous as to make it impossible or impractical
to produce them to prove the absence of items in those records, precedent
exists for the testimony of the custodian or other qualified officer as to the
absence of such items in the records.") (citations and footnotes omitted).
245. See State v. Chapman, 331 Md. 448, 463-64, 628 A.2d 676, 684 (1993); cf.
State v. Rogers, 426 A.2d 1035, 1040 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981) (affidavit
of local government official stating that defendant had no permit for revolver
in prosecution for possession of a revolver without a permit did not violate
defendant's right of confrontation); United States v. Cruz, 492 F.2d 217, 220
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 935 (1974) (holding admission of certificate
of non-registration of destructive device, which recited that a diligent search
was conducted and disclosed no registration, did not violate the defendant's
right of confrontation); MD. RULE 2-504.2(b)(8); supra note 194.
Self-Authentication of Business Records
ness records without live witnesses. Like both Maryland Rules 2-
510(g) and 3-510(g) regarding hospital records, and the statute
regarding bank records upheld in Chapman v. State,246 Rule 5-
902(a)(11) advances judicial economy at no real cost to fairness.
When business records containing opinions are offered pur-
suant to Rule 5-902(a)(11), they must be examined under the same
body of rules and cases addressing both the admissibility of business
records and of opinions that would apply if the records were
authenticated in a traditional way. Business records, even if ade-
quately authenticated, should not be admitted if the court, in the
exercise of its discretion, finds them untrustworthy.
In civil cases, if the opponent demonstrates a need to cross-
examine an out-of-court opinion declarant, the declarant should
testify at trial, unless the opponent has had the opportunity to
subpoena the witness and has not done so.
In criminal cases, the accused's confrontation right-unless
waived, as by failure to subpoena the declarant after notice under
Rule 5-902(a)(1 )-will demand that an available out-of-court de-
clarant testify as the opinion witness when the opinion concerns
nonroutine, highly significant matters. If the declarant is unavail-
able to testify, the otherwise admissible opinion should be admitted
only if it survives an evaluation for trustworthiness, under the
teachings of the United States Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts. 47
Rule 5-902(a)(1 1) does not appear to extend to proof of absence
of a business record or absence of an entry in a business record,
which is a question for the Court of Appeals of Maryland. Rule
5-803(b)(7) is clear that such proof may be made by a live witness
with knowledge. That witness's testimony may well take the form
of summary evidence, governed by Rule 5-1006.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 173-89.
247. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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XI. APPENDIX: SUGGESTED FORMS FOR
CERTIFICATION OF A DOMESTIC BUSINESS RECORD
UNDER MARYLAND RULE 5-902(A)(11)
Although, just as under 18 U.S.C. § 3505, there is no "magic
form ' ' 4 8 for compliance with Maryland Rule 5-902(a)(11), it may
be helpful to provide examples of what should suffice.2 49
The Texas Rules provide the following sample affidavit:
248. United States v. Strickland, 935 F.2d 822, 831 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 1036 (1992).
249. The author expresses her gratitude to Walter A. Pennington, Esq., who shared
with her the following sample form he prepared for consideration by the
Montgomery County Bar Association:
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY,
MARYLAND
ABC CORPORATION
Plaintiff, Civil 123,456-94
VS.
XYZ CORPORATION Trial Date: 12/25/1994
Defendant.
CERTIFICATE UNDER 5-902(A)(11)
I, , am a custodian of the records and am qual-
ified by (name of business) to testify regarding the records that are
kept by the above listed corporation and I hereby state the following:
1. That I am over the age of 18. That my business address is
2. That the record(s) attached to this certificate were made at or
near the time of the occurrence of the matters set forth in the record(s)
by a person with knowledge of the matters contained in the record(s),
or from information transmitted by a person with knowledge of the
matters contained in the record(s).
3. The record(s) were made and kept in the course of the regularly
conducted business activity.
4. The record(s) were made and kept by the regularly conducted
business activity as a regular practice.
I solemnly declare and affirm under the penalties of perjury that
the foregoing statements are true and correct.
Custodian of Records
State of
County of
Subscribed and Sworn to before me this - day of
199_
Notary Public
My Commission Expires: , 1994-
Attachment to letter from Walter Allen Pennington, Esq. to Lynn McLain
(October 18, 1994).
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AFFIDAVIT
Before me, the undersigned authority, personally ap-
peared , who, being by me duly sworn,
deposed as follows:
My name is , I am of sound mind,
capable of making this affidavit, and personally ac-
quainted with the facts herein stated:
I am the custodian of the records of
Attached hereto are pages of records from
_ These said pages of records are kept
by in the regular course of business, and it was
the regular course of business of for an em-
ployee or representative of , with knowledge
of the act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis, recorded
to make the record or to transmit information thereof to
be included in such record; and the record was made at or
near the time or reasonably soon thereafter. The records
attached hereto are the original or exact duplicates of the
original.
Affiant
SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED before me on the __
day of , 19-.
Notary Public, State of Texas
Notary's printed name:
My commission expires: 250
The Texas Rules properly make clear that the form is not mandatory:
"A form for the affidavit of such person as shall make such affidavit
as is permitted in paragraph (a) above shall be sufficient if it follows
this form, though this form shall not be exclusive, and an affidavit
which substantially complies with the provisions of this rule shall
suffice .... ",251
Texas' sample form simply traces the requirements explicitly
stated in the Rule.252 A similar skeletal form with a few stylistic
changes follows:
250. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 902(b); TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 902(b).
251. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 902(b); TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 902(b).
252. Such a skeletal certification generally should be constitutionally sufficient. See
United States v. Miller, 830 F.2d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The Bank of
Zurich records are accompanied by a statement under criminal penalty for
falsity before the Public Prosecutor for the District of Zurich by Charles
Zurrer, vice director of the bank. Zurrer certifies the authenticity and accuracy
of the records and that they were kept in the ordinary course of business and
prepared at or around the time the events occurred by a person familiar with
those matters or on the basis of information given by such a person."); see
also supra note 122.
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[Case Heading]
Affidavit
1. I, (name of individual), am of sound mind and over 18
years of age.
2. I am the custodian of the records of (name of business
entity), a (corporation) (limited liability company) (part-
nership) (sole proprietorship) (unincorporated associa-
tion) (business entity). [Alternative for noncustodians: I
am employed by (name of business entity), a (corpo-
ration) (limited liability company) (partnership) (sole
proprietorship) (unincorporated association) (business
entity) in the position of (job) and in the fulfillment of
my duties have gained sufficient knowledge to qualify
me to attest to the following facts].
3. The (number of pages) pages attached to this affidavit
are made and kept by (name of business entity) in the
regular course of business; it was the regular course of
business of (name of business entity) for an employee
or representative of (name of business entity) with
knowledge of the act, event, condition, opinion, or
diagnosis recorded to make the record or to transmit
the information to be included in such record, 253 and
the record was made at or near the time of the act,
event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis, or reasonably
soon thereafter.
4. The attached pages are (the original) (the exact dupli-
cates of the original) records.
Affiant
[Notary's Certificate]
On the other hand, if counsel anticipates questions about the
reliability of the records, counsel might wish to use a more elaborate
form, so as to enhance the court's ability to make a finding of
trustworthiness. Additional information describing the type of busi-
ness activity in which the business entity is engaged would be useful
to the court in evaluating whether the statements in the records in
question are related to and made in the ordinary course of that
activity. A provision that the records are used and relied upon by
253. Cf. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1561(a)(3) (West Supp. 1994) (records "were prepared
by the personnel of the business in the ordinary course of business at or near
the time of the act, condition, or event").
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the business for a stated purpose also would be helpful. 214 Such an
affidavit could add paragraphs 5 and 6 to the above example, using
language such as the following:
5. (Name of the business entity) is engaged in (type of
business activity), and records of the type certified are
made routinely, to further the business purpose(s) of
(business purposes for the records).
6. Records of the type attached, including those attached,
are used and relied upon by (name of business entity)
for the purpose(s) of (purposes for which records are
relied on by the business).
254. See, e.g., Hanley v. United States, 416 F.2d 1160, 1166-68 (5th Cir. 1969);
Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Knox Homes Corp., 343 F.2d 887, 896 (5th
Cir. 1965) ("The theory underlying the [federal Business Records Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1732 (1984), the statutory precursor of Federal Rule of Evidence
803(6),] is that business records in the form regularly kept by the company
and relied on by that company in the ordinary course of its business have a
certain probability of trustworthiness."); Rivcom Corp. v. Agricultural Labor
Relations Bd., 670 P.2d 305, 323 n.28 (Cal. 1983) (en banc) ("According to
[the custodian's] affidavit, [the records] were prepared in the 'normal' course
of business and are 'the payroll records used and relied upon by [NPMS] in
paying the employees who worked at Rancho Sespe and . . . to comply with
various wage payment laws.' As such, they necessarily were up-to-date employee
records, and NPMS' reliance on them amply establishes their trustworthiness.
They were properly admitted."); Chapman v. State, 331 Md. 448, 459, 628
A.2d 676, 681-82 (1993) ("Hearsay evidence admitted under the business records
exception is generally regarded as reliable since any risk of 'insincerity will be
minimized, because the business will want accurate records to rely on,' Lynn
McLain, Maryland Evidence § 803(6).1, at 380 (1987) and '[tihe very regularity
and continuity of the records are calculated to train the recordkeeper in habits
of precision.' 2 McCormick on Evidence § 286, at 265."); cf. United States v.
Blake, 488 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1973) (under 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1984), precursor
to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6), error to admit evidence as business records,
absent evidence that they were made in the ordinary course of business, and
absent testimony explaining the system under which the records were made and
the efforts employed to ensure their accuracy).

